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This paper examines the effect on current student performance of the 19th century Partitions of
Poland among Austria, Prussia and Russia. Using a regression discontinuity design, I show that
student test scores are 0.6 standard deviations higher on the Austrian side of the former Austrian-
Russian border, despite the modern similarities of the three regions. However, I do not find
evidence for differences across the Prussian-Russian border. Using a theoretical model and in-
direct evidence, I argue that the Partitions have persisted through their impact on social norms
toward local schools. Nevertheless, the persistent effect of Austria is puzzling, given the historical
similarities of the Austrian and Prussian education systems. I argue that the differential legacy of
Austria and Prussia originates from the Austrian Empire’s policy to promote Polish identity in
schools and the Prussian Empire’s efforts to Germanize the Poles through education.
1. Introduction
An intriguing idea in recent economic and historical research is that modern economies are affected by past institutions, even
after the institutions have ceased to exist (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008). In the case of education, historical investments in public
goods and property rights have been shown to affect students’ current education attainment, the provision of schools and literacy
levels (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005; Huillery, 2009; Iyer, 2010). However, we know less about the mechanisms underlying these long-run
consequences of institutions, and if and how they depend on social context. It has been argued, for instance, that universal schooling
might level the historical differences in education outcomes (Dell, 2010). In this paper, I show that two historical parts of Poland,
which had similar past education systems and provision of public education, have - relative to a control region - very different long
run effects on current student performance. I focus on social norms toward local schools as a channel of persistence (Akerlof and
Kranton, 2010; Sakalli, 2018). I also argue that the interaction between national identity and institutions has created different social
norms toward local schools in the two historical parts, generating the difference in student performance today.
Specifically, I analyze the Partitions of Poland (1815–1918) among Austria, Prussia, and Russia (see Fig. 1) as a laboratory to
investigate how history matters for student performance. Comparisons of geographic characteristics and the historical literature have
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concluded that the former borders between the empires were not drawn to reflect any pre-existing socio-economic, historical,
geographic or ethnic divisions (Wandycz, 1974; Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya, 2015; Becker et al., 2016). Consequently, I will argue that
the Partitions of Poland provide an exogenous variation in institutional heritage in modern Poland. The three partitions differed
significantly; However, in terms of education systems, the Austrian and Prussian institutions were similar as the former was copied
from the latter (Lamberti, 1989; Cohen, 1996). The Austrian and Prussian systems were financed from local taxes, had compulsory
elementary and optional secondary education, and shared similar curricula and pedagogical methods. The provision of public
Fig. 1. The Partitions of Poland 1815–1918. Note: the maps show the borders of the 19th century Partitions of Poland layered on the modern map of
Poland. The upper map also shows the borders of interwar Poland. The lower map shows the sample under investigation, based on the 50km
bandwidth around the former borders. The borders under investigation are marked by the solid line, the excluded borders are marked by the dashed
line. Silesia and Eastern Prussia are excluded. Source: own visualization based on GIS maps from Kashin and Ziblatt (2012) and MPIDR and
CGG (2012).
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education was comparable in the Austrian and Prussian partitions. The Russian education system, in turn, practically did not exist in
the 19th century (Snyder, 2006).1 The three regions of interest are now within Poland, are ethnically homogeneous and have the
same modern education and legal systems.
Using a regression discontinuity design, I compare the test-measured performance of students in municipalities on the two sides of
the former border between Austria and Russia. I show that municipality-average test scores on the Austrian side are 0.6 standard
deviations higher. However, I do not find evidence for differences across the Prussian-Russian border. These results provide evidence
that history matters in the long run and are consistent with other studies documenting the long-lasting effects of historical heritage
(e.g. Acemoglu et al., 2001; Basten and Betz, 2013; Dell et al., 2018).
There are many potentially relevant channels through which the Partitions have affected the current student performance, but
given the complexity of the treatment it is impossible to identify all of them. I focus on a social-norm channel, which has been
underlined in general studies (Karaja, 2013; Grosfeld et al., 2013; Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya, 2015; Becker et al., 2016) and in the
context of education outcomes (Feir, 2016; Sakalli, 2018). In particular, I argue that people living in the former Austrian Empire have
inherited positive social norms toward local schools (institutions), leading to a more intensive schooling effort and higher student
performance. I provide four pieces of evidence to support this hypothesis. Although each of them is tentative and parsimonious, when
taken together they suggest that a social norm is an important transmission mechanism of past institutions. Firstly, I show that the
effect of the Austrian Empire is larger on low-stakes exams than on high-stakes ones, which is consistent with a norm-based model of
student effort (Akerlof and Kranton, 2002). Intuitively, social norms toward local schools matter more for low-stakes exams because
there is no universal motivation to obtain a high score. Secondly, I use survey data on proxies for social norms to show that people
from the former Austrian Empire are more likely: to choose education as first or second priority in governmental spending; to say that
education is crucial for a decent life; and to select family tradition as an important determinant of school choice. Thirdly, I show that
the Austrian Partition has had a positive and large effect on kindergarten attendance that cannot be explained by the historical supply
of kindergartens. Finally, I investigate whether the Partitions can have persistent effects on political outcomes, which are also
affected by social norms. The results show that people living in the former Russian partition are less likely to vote in central elections
and those in the former Austrian partition voted more in favour of the EU accession - a proxy for the acceptance of foreign power. At
the same time, I show that other channels, in particular skill-biased migrations and urbanization, are unlikely to explain my results.
The historical migration patterns do not show any strong selection for in- or out-migration to or from the Austrian partition. To
evaluate present-day migration, I show that a hypothetical modern extreme skill-biased migration scenario cannot explain the effect
of the Austrian Partition. The Austrian partition is more urbanized and has a higher population density, however, using various
methods, I show that accounting for this channel cannot explain the observed gap in student performance between the Austrian and
Russian partitions.
Why social norms differ in the Austrian and Prussian partitions is puzzling given that the former was not economically superior
over the latter and that the two Empires had almost identical education systems and similar provisions of public education.2 I argue
that the differential legacy of Austria and Prussia originates from the different interactions between education institutions and Polish
identity. While the Prussian state used education mainly to Germanize Poles (e.g. through insisting on German as the language of
instruction), the Austrian state used education to support Polish identity (e.g. through allowing Polish as the language of instruction)
(Lamberti, 1989; Cohen, 1996).3 Because of the historical attitudes of the Polish population toward the education systems, positive
social norms toward education may have been more likely to emerge in the Austrian partition. These could then have been trans-
mitted through generations and still affect student and parental effort. Consistent with this hypothesis, Steele and Aronson (1995)
and Akerlof and Kranton (2010) have provided theoretical and empirical arguments that identity is associated with social norms,
affecting an individual’s schooling choices, school-student relationships and student achievements.
I provide suggestive evidence for the importance of interaction between institutions and identity. Using data on 19th century
education outcomes in Austria and Prussia, I correlate the historical elementary school enrolment with the current student perfor-
mance. The results show that the correlation is null among municipalities from the former Austrian partition, but strongly negative
from the former Prussian partition. These estimates are robust to the inclusion of geographical and socio-economic covariates, yet
they might not be causal. However, assuming that the remaining bias is the same in both regions, the historical expansion of the
education system has a more positive effect on the current student performance in the former Austria than in the former Prussia. This
is in line with the proposed hypothesis, given a positive interaction between identity and institutions in the Austrian Empire. Hence,
the social norms affecting student performance have been more likely to emerge in municipalities with a larger attachment to the
historical Austrian education system. Alternatively, because of a negative interaction between institutions and identity, more intensive
historical exposure to Prussian education has led to a stronger opposing social norm toward the education system. This norm leads to
a lower schooling effort and thus decreases the performance of students.
Overall, the contributions of this study are threefold. Firstly, I show that history matters for student performance and it accounts
for a sizable gap in education achievements. Secondly, I provide evidence that history has persisted through its impact on social
norms toward local schools. Finally, I propose a source of persistence based on the interaction between institutions and identity.
1 The Russian system had no compulsory elementary schooling, no coherent organization of a school network and no political will for expanding
education.
2 Consistently, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013) and Grosfeld et al. (2013) have shown that not all institutions influence social norms or
matter in the long run.
3 Russia also used education as a tool to Russify the population and so the language of instruction was Russian (Snyder, 2006).
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The studies that are closest to mine are Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya (2015), Wysokinska (2011) and Becker et al. (2016).4
Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya (2015) found a persistent effect of the Partitions of Poland on the level of religiosity, belief in democratic
values and rail-road infrastructure, but not on income, industrial production, the share of people with secondary education, cor-
ruption or trust in government institutions. Consistent with my study, the authors argue that the inter-generational transmission of
social norms can shape political and religious preferences, even though the majority of differences between the partitions have been
smoothed out by economic factors. Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya (2015) showed that a historical institution affects behaviour differently
in different domains. In contrast, I show that it affects behaviour in the same domain differently in different places.
Wysokinska (2011) provides a general impact of the Prussian Empire and finds a positive effect of the German administration on
general trust, income and turnout for referenda. Finally, Becker et al. (2016) suggest that, among the Central-Eastern European
countries, the Hapsburg Empire is associated positively with trust toward local state and negatively with the acceptance of cor-
ruption. In addition, Backhaus (2018) showed that the gaps between the partitions in the quantity of education (elementary school
enrolment and illiteracy levels) had disappeared by 1961. In contrast, I show that the gaps in the quality of education have persisted
until today. All the studies mentioned use a regression discontinuity method.
My results are partially consistent with Herbst (2004) and Herbst and Rivkin (2012), who analyzed determinants of the dis-
tribution of exam scores in Poland. In particular, they regressed the exam scores for all municipalities in Poland on a set of modern-
day control variables and the partitions dummies. They found that, relative to Warsaw, the dummy for the former Austrian part had
the largest magnitude, and for the Prussian Empire the lowest. However, they did not use a regression discontinuity design and the
current covariates are likely to be endogenous resulting in biased estimates (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). Moreover, the authors did
not empirically identify the channels of persistence of the Partitions of Poland.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, I present a historical overview of the Partitions of Poland and look in detail at the
education system in each Empire. In Section 3, I describe the data and research methodology, and show the effect of the Partitions of
Poland on the performance of students. Section 4 identifies the channels of persistence. Section 5 discusses the sources of persistence.
Finally, Section 6 concludes and discusses policy implications.
2. Historical overview
This section describes in more detail the Partitions of Poland and the situation of the Poles in the 19th century education systems
in Prussia, Austria and Russia. For readers uninterested in historical details, it is sufficient to read the summary at the end of this
section. The summary also contains information about the modern education system in Poland.
The Partitions of Poland took place in three parts, during the second half of the 18th century and removed Poland from the map of
Europe for 123 years, until the end of World War I.5 The first annexation of the Polish lands by the Russian Empire, the Kingdom of
Prussia and the Hapsburg Austria took place in 1772. Poland lost almost one-third of its territory and 4.5 million inhabitants. In 1793,
Prussia and Russia conducted the second partition, and in 1795 all of the three Empires absorbed the rest of the remaining country.
Thanks to Napoleon I this situation did not last for long; In 1807, he conquered the Polish lands and established the Duchy of Warsaw
- a Polish state controlled by one of Napoleon’s allies. However, the Duchy survived only seven years, as the defeat of Napoleon I in
1814 return the situation how it had been before the Napoleonic Wars.
A new border between the partitions was established during the Congress of Vienna in 1815, after which they remained generally
unchanged until the end of World War I.6 During the first decades following the Congress, the Russian and Prussian administrations
were not systematically oppressive toward Poles. The Congress Kingdom and the Grand Duchy of Poznań- newly created states
controlled by Russia and Prussia respectively - experienced some level of freedom, which gave Poles hope that independence was
within their reach. In the Congress Kingdom this lasted until the unsuccessful uprising against Russia in 1830, after which Poles were
repressed and Russified7 until the end of World War I. In Prussia, the situation of the Poles worsened in the 1870s, when Otto von
Bismarck introduced kulturkampf.8 Differently from the other partitions, the Poles under the Austrian occupation had relatively less
freedom during the first part of the 19th century, but this changed after 1867 when the Austrian administration adopted a more
tolerant and multicultural approach, language freedom being a significant expression of this. Polish was the official language of the
Galician administration9 and could be used as the language of instruction in schools. Contrary to this, in the Russian and Prussian
parts, from the second part of the 19th century, the usage of Polish was limited both in administration and education.
4 For the non-economic literature see: Hryniewicz (2003), Kowalski (2000), Grabowska (2004), Zarycki (2007), and Chuminski (2008).
5 For a more detailed historical description of the Partitions of Poland and debate about the sources of the country’s failure, see Davies (2005a) and
Davies (2005b).
6 In this section, the ”Austrian Partition” refers to the areas which correspond to the historical region of Galicia, that is, the southern parts of
modern Poland and the western parts of modern Ukraine. The Prussian partition is defined as a territory of the pre-Partition Poland, which was
governed by the Prussian Empire after 1815. Cities such as Wrocław or Gdańsk are not within the Prussian partition, as they were not part of Poland
before 1815. The Russian partition corresponds to the central areas of modern Poland, Lithuania and parts of modern Belarus and Ukraine. In the
empirical part of this paper, the definition of each partition is limited only to the territories within modern Poland (see Fig. 1).
7 The most important expressions of Russification were a ban on using Polish in public, forbidding the teaching of Polish and the history of Poland,
promotion of the Russian Orthodox faith combined with repression of the Catholic Church. Additionally, the Tsarist government deported many
students and intellectuals involved in secret Polish societies and fraternities (Wandycz, 1974; Snyder, 2006).
8 A policy direction, which consisted of measures against the Catholic church and the Polish nation.
9 Galicia was part of Poland and Ukraine, which were both under Hapsburg rule.
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In terms of the socio-political situation, the Prussian and Austrian states were more favourable to the self-organization of their
Polish populations. The two Empires introduced a bureaucratic system with a strong administrative ethos (Gillis, 1971; Becker et al.,
2016). The Prussian state was a state of law and, even though the administration discriminated against Poles, grass-root institutions,
such as agricultural societies, credit institutions, reading rooms, newspapers and education circles, helped support the economic
activity of Poles and protect their identity. Similarly, in Austria, ethnic tolerance allowed the creation of institutions spreading and
preserving Polish culture. Two universities in Galicia, the Jagiellonian University in Cracow and Lviv University, played important
roles in the development of Polish intellectual life. All of this was in contrast to the situation for Poles under Russian rule, where
bureaucracy was inefficient (Burke, 1979) and most forms of self-organization were forbidden and fought by the Tsarist adminis-
tration.
The three Partitions displayed different levels of economic development. The best economic situation was in the Prussian part,
where the authorities carried out many reforms, including the abolition of serfdom, agriculture, rather than industry, being the main
driver of economic progress. In the Russian partition, it was industry that developed the most, with clusters of the textile industry
being created in Łódź and Białystok. Warsaw became a modern city with sewers, streets, gas lighting, and a power plant switchboard.
The delayed abolition of serfdom reforms during the second half of the 19th century contributed to the relative backwardness of
agriculture in the Congress Kingdom. However, the worst economic situation was in the Austrian part. Before the end of the 19th
century, Galicia had not been industrialized, and agriculture was underinvested and parcelled. Consequently, people experienced one
of the worst poverty rates in the Hapsburg Empire, and at the beginning of the 20th century, over two million Galicians emigrated to
escape severe economic conditions. However, there were no clear migration patterns with respect to education (see Section 4.2 for
more details).
In 1914, the Partition empires turned against each other and placed Polish lands at a centre of the four-year conflict. World War I
had tragic consequences for the Polish population and economy, but it also led to the unification of Polish lands in 1918. This new
country faced a number of immediate burning challenges: the massive destructions and human losses of the Great War paralysing
economic activity, chaotic and radical political scenery, social and ethnic tensions, massive unemployment and large strikes, high
inflation and rural poverty amongst other. The main task was integrating the country, harmonizing the various institutions inherited
from the empires including their education systems (Wolf, 2007). In addition, a series of economic downturns during the 1920s and
the Great Depression hampered modernization of the country. Polish politicians and institutions became more extractive, as the
system drifted from a democratic parliamentary republic towards an authoritarian presidential republic.
During World War II Poland was occupied by Germany and experienced the largest war losses. Approximately 17% of the 1939
population was killed and 62% of the national wealth was destroyed. The post-war reality, however, brought even more dramatic
changes. As a result of decisions made during the Yalta conference, the country lost its eastern territories in exchange for formerly
eastern parts of Germany, triggering a massive population transfer. Similarly, as after World War 1, the biggest task was to integrate
the new lands and provide a smooth start for the repatriates. At the same time, a communist system with a centrally planned economy
was introduced. On the one hand, the four decades of communism in Poland brought the expansion of education, along with uni-
fication, industrialization and modernization of the country. On the other hand, it led to the erosion of democratic institutions,
profound economic crises and divergence from the West. Popular dissatisfaction resulted in massive protests and the emergence of the
”Solidarność” movement. In 1989, the communists were forced to organise the first (partially) free elections, which were won by the
democratic opposition. After 1989, Poland introduced a market-based economy with a parliamentary democracy. The last two
decades have witnessed impressive economic growth and convergence with Western Europe. These changes accelerated after Poland
joined the European Union in 2004.
In the following subsections, I examine the 19th century education systems of the Polish minorities in Austria, Prussia and Russia.
2.1. The Prussian education system
In 1763, the Prussian state created an education system which became a model for numerous other countries, including the US,
Japan and Austria. Wilhelm von Humboldt, who in 1809 was appointed the Prussian Minister of Education, developed the idea of
universal and compulsory education. Thanks to him, the schooling system became perceived not only as a source of specialists, but
also achieved the universal aim of the general intellectual development of society. The core of the system was the obligatory ele-
mentary school (Volksschule), followed by various types of secondary school. Despite its centralized design, the financing of education
was based on local taxes and municipal school boards managed school operation (Cinnirella and Schueler, 2016).
Despite its modernity and universal character, until 1870, the elementary school fell within the domain of religion (both
Protestant and Catholic). Most schools were confessional, and religion was the main subject in Prussian curricula. Although the state
sought to promote secular and nation-oriented10 education, it was afraid that taking too much power from the Catholic or Protestant
church would motivate them to create competitive networks of private schools. During the 1870s, Adalbert Falk - the Minister of
Ecclesiastical Affairs - implemented a set of secularization reforms. These included limits on the church’s influence, and the pro-
fessionalization and secularization of the school inspectorate. Yet the impact of the reforms was limited, as the clergy retained a
strong position.
Nevertheless, the reforms turned out to be important in the Polish context. The Catholic Church11 helped to cultivate Polish
10 Understood as the German nation.
11 The Protestant church was also affected, but because of its special role in the Prussian state, to a much lesser extent than the Catholic.
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national identity more than any secular movement. Consequently, the policy of secularization was carried out more consistently on
Polish lands than anywhere else (Lamberti, 1989). In addition to this, from 1870 the Prussian state executed repressions on a much
larger scale than it had done before, in particular, it banned the use of Polish in administration and education, forbade the cultivation
of Polish traditions, discriminated against Polish workers in the labour market, and deported Poles and Jews, who did not have
Prussian citizenship.
The most important change for education was the language of instruction. In 1822, the Prussian state permitted the use of Polish
in the eastern regions with significant Polish populations. This lasted until 1870, when kulturkampf redefined the role of elementary
education. As Marjorie Lamberti states: ”Prussian state officials looked to the Volkschule to serve as an instrument of Germanization.
The school’s function was not to only teach Polish children to speak German but also acculturate them into the German nation”
(1989, p.109). As a result, German was introduced in the Grand Duchy of Poznań and Eastern and Western Prussia as the language of
instruction starting with the first two years of schooling. At the same time, Polish was permitted only during religion classes and final
exams.12 When, in 1901 Polish, was banned completely, students and parents in Września started to protest. Soon this turned into a
massive strike, which included around 75 thousand students from 800 schools. Even though the scale of protests surprised the
Prussian government and some politicians called for a revision of the ban, the Ministry of Education retained the policy, which
(Lamberti, 1989, p.109) has described as ”breed[ing] germanophobia and a repugnance for the school in Polish families”. But the
enforced language of instruction was not the only reason why Polish parents opposed the education system.
Education inequality and feelings of unfairness were other reasons. The introduction of German as the language of instruction
implied that teachers had to teach in a language in which they did not always have the required proficiency. Moreover, students from
exclusively Polish speaking families had to first learn German, leaving less time for other classes. Finally, Polish schools were
systematically under-financed compared to German ones (Cinnirella and Schueler, 2016). The average student-teacher ratio in the
Polish lands was 93:1, while in the rest of Prussia it was 60:1 (Lamberti, 1989, p.129). All these translated into a lower quality of the
Polish schools13 and raised feelings of unfairness among Polish parents.
Moreover, the situation for teachers was ambiguous. As pointed out by Lamberti (1989), during the strikes, Polish teachers took
the side of the Prussian administration because they were afraid of losing their jobs. This in turn led to acts of hostility toward these
teachers: (Lamberti, 1989, p.146) describes how ”the Polish press rebuked the teacher for currying favour with the school inspectors
and promoting the use of German in order to obtain bonuses. In public places the teachers were insulted, threatened and assaulted”.
Polish parents not only distrusted and clashed with the institution of the elementary school, but also with its personnel.
Finally, as mentioned above, the education reforms aimed against the church were executed more rigorously on the Polish lands.
The most profound were the introduction of interconfessional schools14 and the secularization of the school inspectorate. From the
very beginning, the Polish population viewed this innovation with distrust. As Lamberti claims, ”[t]he interconfessional school policy
further alienated the Polish people from the school administration. ... [they] had good reasons to believe that the interconfessional
schools were being opened for the purpose of Germanizing the Polish youth” (1989, p.115).
The German language of instruction, inequality, the role of teachers and interconfessional education all motivated hostility
toward the education system among the Polish families living in the Prussian Empire. Yet, in comparison to the other parts of Poland,
the system was effective. Law enforcement was widespread and most children who attended the elementary school were taught how
to read and write. This was partially because treating education as a tool of Germanization additionally motivated the administration
to execute compulsory schooling. As such, the Prussian education system combined effective institutions alongside its set of anti-
Polish regulations.
2.2. The Austrian education system
The Austrian education system was to a large extent a copy of the Prussian model (Cohen, 1996) . As far back as 1781, Joseph II
had established the principle of mandatory primary education, however, until 1848 the education system mainly served as training
reserved for administration officials (the Emperor Francis I used to say: “I need no learned men; I need only good officials”). The
People’s Spring movement brought the Humboldtian model of education and, in 1850, Leo Thun - the Minister of Education - initiated
a period of reforms that modernized the education system. The strongest adherent to and executor of the reforms was the faction of
German Liberals in the Austrian Parliament, who based their ideas on the Prussian model. Although delayed by a few decades, the
amendments paralleled the developments in Prussia. Local tax-funded elementary schools (equivalent to Prussian schools, to which
attendance was obligatory until 14) were fully introduced following the 1867 reform and the General Primary School Law of 1869.
Also, secondary and higher education were modelled on the Prussian system (including the curricula).15
Nevertheless, the systems differed in one important aspect. While in Prussia education was the main tool of Germanization, in
Austria it was seen as a tool to promote national identities. However, this was not so from the beginning. During the first part of the
12 However, local governors could order exclusive teaching in German.
13 Still, it was much better than in Russia or Austria, see for example the illiteracy rates in Fig. 2.
14 Interconfessional schools (also called mixed) gathered students from different religious groups.
15 Gary B. Cohen states: ”The Austrian reformers of the late 1840s and 1850s adopted much of the early nineteenth century German model of
academic secondary and higher education. ... During the late nineteenth century, the discourse of the Austrian government officials and educators
on such matters was much the same as that of their counterparts in Germany. The Austrians identified many of the same problems regarding
curricula and the rapid growth in secondary and higher education as did their German counterparts” (1996, p.259–260).
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19th century, the official language of instruction at all stages of education was German. Only in 1850 did the reformative movement
introduce Polish at the primary education level. Still, as reported by Cvrcek and Zajicek (2013), in 1865 local elites favoured public
education only if it was in German. This changed after 1867, when the second wave of reforms extended the Polish language of
instruction to secondary and higher education.
Another important aspect of Austrian education was its inclusiveness. The expansion of the elementary and secondary school
network was possible thanks to the proactive attitude of local governments and voluntary associations. The growing demand for
education from previously uneducated groups resulted in numerous grass-root education initiatives. The non-German speaking ethnic
groups and Jews had greater aspirations toward education than Germans. Also new lower-middle classes, for instance, the children of
independent business owners, were considerably more attracted by the possibilities offered by education than the old elite. This was
especially visible in the Polish part of the Austrian Empire, where agriculture was backward and extensively parcelled. The beginning
of the 20th century saw rapid growth in elementary and secondary education in Galicia. The share of elementary school students in
the population almost tripled between 1880 and 1910 (GUS, 2003) (see Table 2) and the secondary enrolment ratio increased by
120% (in the German speaking lands it increased by 52%) (Cohen, 1996).16 As pointed out by Cohen (1996, p.257), ”by 1910 the
Polish speaking share of Austrian enrolments significantly exceeded the Polish speaking share of the Austrian population”. There was
also much popular and political pressure to open advanced education to children from poorer strata. At the same time, however,
literacy levels and schools’ attainment were still lower there than in the Prussian Partition or other parts of the Austrian Empire.17
Fig. 2. Literacy levels in Interwar Poland (1931). Note: the map shows the county-level literacy levels in 1931. Literacy means ”able to read and
write”. The borders of the Partitions of Poland are marked by the dashed line. The modern borders of Poland are marked by the solid line. Source:
author’s computation using the Census of 1931. Own visualization based on GIS maps from Kashin and Ziblatt (2012) and MPIDR and CGG (2012).
16 The secondary enrolment analysed per thousand inhabitants in the Polish speaking lands of the Hapsburg Empire was: 1880 - 2.74, 1890 - 2.78,
1900 - 3.77, 1910 - 6.05; in the German speaking lands it was: 1880 - 3.88, 1890 - 4.04, 1900 - 4.61, 1910 - 5.88 (Cohen, 1996, p.141).
17 Cohen claims: “In the 1870s and 1880s the majority of school aged children in Galicia ... did not attend Volksschulen. In 1880 only 21% of the
population 6 years or older could read in Galicia. In 1910 83.5% of the total population in Austria older than 11 was literate while in Galicia this
number was 58%”(1996, p.64).
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The Poles living in Galicia saw education as the principle means for preserving national identity and improving their material
conditions. Even though law enforcement and the quality of institutions were not as good as in the Prussian Empire, the education
system created positive relationships between schools and citizens.
A remaining question, the answer to which is beyond the scope of this paper, is why the Prussian and Austrian Empires im-
plemented different ethnic policies from the second half of the 19th century. The Austrian state was weaker and the territory more
ethnically fragmented and, consequently, a policy of Germanization could lead to social unrest. In fact, it was the revolutions of 1848
that contributed to the reorientation of the ethnic policy of the Hapsburg Empire. Conversely, the Prussian Empire was relatively
homogeneous, the state stronger and thus the Germanization policy was more likely to be successful.
2.3. The Russian education system
Peter I and Catherine II created an education system whose core remained largely unchanged until the end of the 19th century.
Besides much investment in universities and growing numbers of enrolled elementary school students, members of the ruling class
did not accept the Humboldtian approach to education. Sergei Uvarov, the Minister of Education (1831–1849) during the rule of
Nikolai I, may be the best example of one such dignitary. He laid the foundations for the modern and high-quality higher education in
Russia18, but clearly opposed broadening and developing education for people from lower strata. He ”believed that excessive edu-
cation would only create dissatisfaction among the peasantry” and that ”the lower classes had to be protected from too much
knowledge” (Kassof, 2004).
Another problem was the chaotic organization of the school system. There was no obligatory schooling and the Ministry of
Education did not control the network of schools.19 Lacking central organization, the system was characterized by class-based duality,
with separate curricula for students from the upper and lower strata. Consequently, the illiteracy levels were high: in 1917, only 70%
of the urban and 30% of the rural population could read and write.20
The situation was especially bad in the Polish lands (the Congress Kingdom). The lack of education institutions was accompanied
by intensive Russification and repression of Poles21 (Chubarov, 2000). For instance, due to the repression, which took place after the
November Uprising in 1830, the number of secondary school students was reduced by 50% until 1855 (Snyder, 2006).
Many studies underline the rapid development of education in Tsarist Russia, especially at the end of the 19th century. This
becomes undoubtedly true once we think about the general situation of Russian society during, for example, the Napoleonic Wars.
Nevertheless, the Congress Kingdom was one of the most advanced parts of the Russian Empire in terms of economic and social
development. Compared with other parts of Poland, its development of education could have been wasted.
2.4. Summary
Table 1 summarizes the main differences between the partitions. Developed agriculture, modern bureaucracy and strong law
enforcement characterized the Prussian partition. The Prussian authorities allowed the self-organization of Poles, which contributed
to the preservation of Polish culture, which otherwise may have been threatened by Germanization. In the Russian partition, in-
dustrialization led to modernization and the development of cities. But weak law enforcement and the anti-Polish orientation of the
Tsarist policy undermined the position of Poles. In the Austrian partition, backward agriculture and industry were responsible for
harsh socio-economic conditions. However, the Austrian administration developed an effective bureaucracy apparatus and, from the
1860s, significant autonomy was given to the Polish population.
In terms of education systems, the Austrian and Prussian institutions were very similar as the former was copied from the latter.
They were both financed from local taxes, had compulsory elementary and optional secondary education, and shared similar cur-
ricula and pedagogical methods. However, while the Prussian state used these institutions to Germanize Poles (e.g. through the
German language of instruction), the Austrian state used them to support Polish identity (e.g. through the Polish language of in-
struction). Consequently, Poles under Prussian rule opposed the education system and were hostile toward school personnel
(especially teachers). Remarkably, massive school strikes were organized by Polish parents, the largest one taking place in 1901 when
70 thousand Polish students refused to go to school. The Russian education system, in turn, practically did not exist in the 19th
century.
The differences in the education outcomes between the three partitions are documented in Table 2. School enrolment in the
Prussian part in 1864 was as high as 93%. In the Austrian part enrolment was significantly lower throughout the 19th century, but it
had converged with the Prussian level by 1914. Notably, at the outset of WWI, in the Russian part less than 25% of the school age
population attended a school. Similarly, the provision of public schools in the 1910s was practically the same in the Austrian and
Prussian partitions: on average, in the former, there was one school per 13 km2, and in the latter, one school per 10 km2. However, in
the Russian partition, there was one school per 27km2. After Poland gained independence in 1918, the literate population was as low
18 On the other hand, he is responsible for the closure of the University of Vilnius after the November Uprising in 1830 (Whittaker, 1984).
19 Kassof (2004) estimates that ”sixty-seven different types of primary schools [existed] in Russia in1914″.
20 As pointed out by Bowen (1962, p.23), during World War I, ”literacy was so rare that most Russian troops were unable to write home, even if
their families could read”.
21 Interestingly, the policy of the Russian Empire toward other nations was not always that harsh. Alexander II, hated in Poland, has a monument
in Helsinki.
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as 35 percent in certain formerly Russian lands, whereas in the former Prussia, it was above 90 percent. The literacy levels in 1931 are
depicted in Fig. 2. Regions in the West had the highest levels of literacy; these were moderately lower in the South (except for the
presently Ukrainian parts), and the lowest levels were in the Central and Eastern parts of Poland. These differences were smoothed
out after World War II, when 8-year education became obligatory in Poland (Meissner and Majorek, 2000; Backhaus, 2018). Yet,
social norms toward education could not be so easily smoothed.
Between 1999 and 2017, the Polish comprehensive and compulsory education system consisted of 6 years of elementary school,
followed by 3 years of lower-secondary school (gimnazjum). Admission to comprehensive schools was based on catchment areas,
which means that each student living within an area has a right to attend a local public school. However, parents may request an
alternative school, but its principal has the right to reject applications. After the 9th grade, students enter the tracking and non-
obligatory part of education. They can choose a track (academic, mixed or vocational) and apply to any high schools, but admission is
not guaranteed.
Table 1
Historical characteristics of the Partitions.
Characteristic/Partition: Russian Austrian Prussian
General characteristics
Agriculture Advanced Least Advanced Most Advanced
Industry Most Advanced Least Advanced Advanced
Law Enforcement Lowest Normal Highest
Organization of Poles Low High High
Quality of Bureaucracy Low High High
Education systems
Origin None Prussian Prussian
Introduction N/A Mid 19th Early 19th
Length of compulsory education None 8 years 8 years
School structure Various 4+4+ 8+
Financing Various Local Local
Language Russian Polish German
Curriculum Russian Polish German
Universities Russian Polish None
Ethnic policy Russification Tolerance Germanization
Table 2
Comparison of the 19th century education outcomes.
Partition/Year : 1840′ 1850′ 1860′ 1870′ 1880′ 1890′ 1900′ 1910′
Elementary school enrolment
Russian - - - - - - 18% 25%
Austrian - - - - 67% 77% 83% 86%
Prussian 62% - 94% - - - - -
Elementary school students as % of total population
Russian 1.3% 1.4% 2.3% 2.3% 1.9% 2.4% 2.9% 3.6%
Austrian 1.6% 1.8% 3% 3.6% 6.9% 9.7% 11.4% 13.5%
Prussian 12.1% - 14.3% - 16.6% 17.4% 19% 19.3%
Total area per elementary school in km2
Russian - - - - - - - 26.9
Austrian - - - - - - - 12.8
Prussian - - - - - - - 9.8
Elementary school teachers per 1000 population aged 5–15
Russian - - - - - - - 2
Austrian - - - - - - - 11
Prussian - - - - - - - 13
Elementary school pupils per teacher
Russian 55 - 55 - - 49 54 56
Austrian - 42 72 - - 104 87 79
Prussian - - - - 91 82 73 70
Share of population who can read, aged 9 or less
Russian - - 18% - - 41% - -
Austrian - - - - - - - 69%a
Prussian - - - - - - - 95%b
Notes: a: share of population aged 11 or less. Excludes territories from modern Ukraine. b data only for Śla̧sk Cieszyński.; Otherwise, Austrian is the
whole Galicia; Prussian is the Grand Duchy of Poznań; Russian is the Congress Kingdom. Source: GUS (2003) and GUS (2014).
P. Bukowski Journal of Comparative Economics xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
9
3. The partitions of Poland and student performance
3.1. Data
My analysis draws on comprehensive municipality-level registry data on obligatory, standardized and externally graded ex-
amination scores for the period 2005 - 2011, published by the Central Examination Board of Poland. The available exam scores are
from a low-stakes general 6th grade exam (taken at the end of elementary school) and a high-stakes mathematics and science 9th
grade exam (taken at the end of lower-secondary school). While the former serves mainly a diagnostic purpose, the latter matters in
the high school admission process and thus motivates students (and their parents) to obtain their best score. The tests are stan-
dardized at the country level and are corrected double-blindly outside school by randomly chosen professional test checkers.
Socio-economic control variables at the municipality level come from the Central Statistical Office of Poland and the System of
Education Information. Geographical and climate data come from the WorldClim.org project (Hijmans et al., 2005). For the full
description of the available variables see Table A1.
Descriptive statistics for rural municipalities located at most 50km from the borders are presented in Table 3. Since the de-
scriptives are for the present period, they might reflect the effect of the Partitions of Poland. The border areas of the former Russian
partition seem to have the worst socio-economic situations, as the rates of unemployment are highest, expenditures are lowest and
the migration balances are negative. Importantly, the former Russian areas on the Austrian-Russian and Prussian-Russian borders are
today similar (Columns 3 and 8). The municipalities that were under Prussian rule are characterized by a high share of employment
in agriculture22, a high share of people aged 0–18, positive migration balance and low levels of unemployment. The situation in the
former Austrian zone is similar to the former Prussian, except for the lower importance of agriculture and a higher population number
and density.
The rural borderlands of the former Austrian partition have the best education outcomes (except the number of additional classes
and the level of scholarization), even though these lands do not necessarily perform better in other socio-economic indicators.
Importantly, they also have higher education spending per capita, but this difference disappears when the general spatial trends are
accounted for (see Table 6). The former Prussian and Russian borderlands have similar levels of achievement, but the former have
larger classes and a higher number of additional lessons. The high performance of students from the former Austrian partition is also
confirmed by Figs. 3 and 4, which show the spatial distribution of the 6th and 9th grade exams in 2011, for the whole country. It can
Table 3
Descriptive statistics.
Border: Russian-Prussian Russian-Austrian
Variable/Partition: Prussian Russia Diff Austrian Russian Diff
mean sd mean sd (1)-(3) mean sd mean sd (6)-(8)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) (8) (9)
6th grade exam (2011) 24.1 1.46 24 1.54 0.146 25.3 1.43 24.2 1.6 1.18⁎⁎⁎
9th grade exam (2011) 22.1 1.91 23.1 2.2 −1⁎⁎⁎ 23.9 1.88 22.7 2.14 1.19⁎⁎⁎
Higher education (2002 in %) 4.17 1.3 3.7 0.926 0.47⁎⁎ 4.89 1.88 4.16 1.31 0.73⁎⁎⁎
Kindergarten attendance (2011 in %) 58.6 14.7 58.2 13.4 0.45 60.3 13 54.7 13.6 5.6⁎⁎⁎
Sec. school scholarization (2011 in %) 89.8 15.5 93.2 17.2 −3.48 91.4 8.41 93.7 10.2 −2.36*
Additional lessons (2009) 26.3 11.1 23.5 12 2.87+ 23.6 10.8 23.1 11.3 0.56
Class size (2009) 16.2 2.6 14.6 2.7 1.6⁎⁎⁎ 15.3 2.4 13.8 2.62 1.51⁎⁎⁎
Elementary schools per km2 (2011) 0.036 0.015 0.039 0.016 0 0.084 0.038 0.042 0.02 0.05⁎⁎⁎
Secondary schools per km2 (2011) 0.014 0.007 0.014 0.007 −.003 0.038 0.038 0.017 0.01 0.021⁎⁎⁎
Expenditure per capita (2011 in PLN) 3172 789 3111 617 60.5 3204 735 3079 685 125
Edu. expenditure per capita (2011 in PLN) 1105 173 1147 188 −42.3 1163 191 1073 220 89.6⁎⁎⁎
Population (2011) 7277 3313 6205 2533 1071⁎⁎ 11594 7935 6379 3143 5214⁎⁎⁎
Population density (2011) 59.2 22.6 57.2 18.3 2 136 81 61.1 28.8 75⁎⁎⁎
Migration balance (2011) 1.96 7.65 -0.18 6.05 2.14* 1.78 5.71 -2.11 3.87 3.88⁎⁎⁎
People aged 0–18 (2011 in %) 21.5 1.29 20.7 1.42 0.85 ⁎⁎⁎ 21.2 2.02 18.6 1.56 2.63⁎⁎⁎
Unemployment(2011 in %) 9.11 0.336 10.2 0.376 −1.09* 9.28 0.311 9.39 0.297 −.11
Agriculture (2010 in %) 10.79 8.66 4.41 6.09 6.38⁎⁎⁎ 3.73 4.7 4 5.38 −.27
Altitude (in meters) 106 36.9 121 31.7 −14.4⁎⁎ 265 101 237 54.3 28.4⁎⁎
Precipitation (in mm) 541 18.3 540 21.5 1.38 672 75.5 603 51.5 69⁎⁎⁎
Temperature (in C°) 7.93 0.34 8.07 0.44 −.14* 7.83 0.5 7.57 0.34 0.26⁎⁎⁎
Number of municipalities 80 126 164 137
Notes: Means and standard deviations for the sample of rural municipalities, located at most 50km from the former Russian-Prussian or Russian-
Austrian borders. Municipalities located in Ślşskie, Warmińsko-Mazurskie and Opolskie voivodeships are excluded. Definitions of variables are given
in Table A1.
22 The agriculture practice on the former Prussian lands is based on large, business-oriented farms, which are not common in the rest of the
country.
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be clearly seen that the territory of the former Austrian Empire houses a cluster of high-performing municipalities.
3.2. Empirical strategy
A straightforward comparison of schools in the former Prussian, Austrian and Russian partitions neglects unobserved differences
between these areas, leading to biased estimates of the effect of the Partitions of Poland. To solve this problem, I follow Dell (2010)
and employ a geographical two-dimensional regression discontinuity design, which evaluates the effect of the Partitions by focusing
on a discontinuous jump at the borders.23 To control for the potential confounding effects of geographical location, I narrow the
analysis only to areas located close to the partitions’ borders and include into the regression a polynomial of latitude and longitude.
The model can be written as:= + + + +y f location D G( )it i i i it (1)
where i indexes municipality and t indexes year. f(locationi) is a polynomial of latitude and longitude, the dummy D takes value 1 for
the former Russian areas and value 0 for either the Austrian or Prussian, Gi are time-invariant geographical controls (altitude,
precipitation and temperature), and ϵit denotes idiosyncratic shocks. The outcome variables are the standardized (Z-score) 6th grade
exam score and the standardized mathematics and science 9th grade exam scores,24 which are available from 2005 to 2011. The
sample consists of municipalities that are located within a given distance to the borders (the bandwidth). I pool the data and estimate
the model using a random effect estimator, as it produces more efficient estimates in the presence of individual effects. Nevertheless,
in order to see whether the results are not driven by any particular year, I also reported OLS estimates for each year separately.
Fig. 3. The distribution of the 6th grade exam score in 2011. Note: the map shows the distribution of the 6th grade low-stakes exam score in 2011 at
the municipality level. The borders of the Partitions of Poland are layered on the modern map of Poland. The border under investigation are marked
by the solid line, the excluded border are marked by the dashed line. Source: own visualization based on the Central Board of Examination data and
GIS maps from Kashin and Ziblatt (2012) and MPIDR and CGG (2012).
23 For more about the geographical regression discontinuity design see Keele and Titiunik (2014), for general discussion about the regression
discontinuity framework see Imbens and Lemieux (2008), Lee and Lemieux (2010), or Angrist and Pischke (2008).
24 The variables are standardized (demeaned and divided by standard deviation) for each year separately.
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The regression discontinuity framework requires a proper specification of the polynomial f(locationi) and the bandwidth. Table A4
reports the Akaike Information Criteria, which can be used for the model selection (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). Quadratic and quartile
polynomials are favoured, however Gelman and Imbens (2018) argue that high-order polynomials might be misleading in the re-
gression discontinuity design. In the baseline regression, I use a quadratic polynomial, but I also report results for linear, cubic and
quartile polynomials and, in Section 3.5, I show that the results are not sensitive to the polynomial selection. The bandwidth selection
is based on the trade-off between the sample size and internal validity. For my baseline specification, I chose a 50km bandwidth, but I
also report results for municipalities located at most 75km and 100km from the borders.
3.3. The borders under investigation
The key assumption for the regression discontinuity design to provide the causal effect of the Partitions of Poland is that exo-
genous variables influencing education performance are smooth at the border. There is a consensus among historians that the borders
of interest25 were not drawn to reflect pre-existing socio-economic, historical, geographic or ethnic divisions (Wandycz, 1974, p.11).
Becker et al. (2016) showed that there were no significant differences between these regions in terms of their pre-Partition char-
acteristics. Backhaus (2018) using data from the 1810 census of the Duchy of Warsaw provided evidence that there was no difference
in the size of population at the Prussian-Russian border, which was established in 1815.26 In addition, I have excluded Silesia and
Eastern Prussia from my analysis, because during the interwar period (1918–1945) they belonged to Germany and were a destination
point for the massive post-WWII resettlement of Poles from the territories of modern Belarus, Lithuania and Ukraine.27 Thus, I ensure
Fig. 4. The distribution of the 9th grade exam score (math and science) in 2011. Note: the map shows the distribution of the 9th grade high-stakes
exam score in math and science in 2011 at the municipality level. The borders of the Partitions of Poland are layered on the modern map of Poland.
The border under investigation are marked by the solid line, the excluded borders are marked by the dashed line. Source: own visualization based on
the Central Board of Examination data and GIS maps from Kashin and Ziblatt (2012) and MPIDR and CGG (2012).
25 The borders of interest were established during the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and remained unchanged for almost 100 years.
26 The 1810 census of the Duchy of Warsaw did not cover the areas of the Austrian partition and thus it is not possible to compare the borderlands
of the Austrian-Russian border.
27 At the same time, almost the whole German population of these regions was expelled to Germany.
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that the observed differences between the areas of interest are due to the Partitions of Poland, not some later historical event. Overall,
my sample consists of areas which experienced a similar history before and after the Partitions, were ethnically homogeneous and are
now within the territory of Poland. Fig. 1 depicts the partitions’ borders layered on the modern boundaries of Poland, with the solid
line representing the borders under investigation, and the dashed line marking the excluded parts. By excluding Silesia, I cannot
directly compare the borderlands between the Austrian and Prussian partitions. The bottom part of Fig. 1 presents the area under
investigation, namely the rural and urban municipalities located at most 50km from the borders of interest.
In my baseline specifications, I focus on rural areas because of two reasons: Firstly, the current migration of people from the rural
to the urban areas, which ignores the Partitions borders, blurs interpretation of the Partitions of Poland effect in the urban areas.
Secondly, large cities (especially Cracow and Kielce) are outliers, as they have generally high-performing students. Nonetheless, the
results based on the sample with include urban municipalities are also reported in the robustness section.
The partitions’ borders under investigation were mostly set along rivers. The border between the Prussian and Russian Empires
was drawn along the Drw’ca and Prosna rivers (which are small waterways), whereas half of the Austrian-Russian border was drawn
along the Vistula river. Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya (2015), using a one-dimensional non-parametric regression discontinuity model,
report only a small difference in altitude on the Austrian-Russian border. Yet, according to my own estimations in Table 4, Panel A
shows that there are significant differences in temperature and precipitation on the Austrian-Russian border when a two-dimensional
specification is used. The ”jump” in altitude on the Russian side of the Austrian-Russian border is around 80m, precipitation is higher
by 30mm and temperature drops by around 0.45 C°. The magnitudes are not large, and they arise because of the riverbed of the
Vistula. On the Prussian-Russian border the two-dimensional specification (Table 4, Panel C) also reports significant differences, but
with smaller magnitudes.28 I control for the geographic and climate characteristics in the baseline regressions (the estimates are
generally insensitive to their inclusion). In addition, at the end of Section 3.5, I show that placebo experiments run on other rivers in
Poland do not show any effect on the performance of students. Overall, I find it very unlikely that these natural differences could
explain education differences between the borderlands or induce other dissimilarities in culture or institutions.
Table 4
Geographic differences.
Dep. Variable: Altitude (m) Precipitation (mm) Temperature (C°)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
The Russian - Austrian border
Panel A : Quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude
Partition effect 79 82 30.8 33.3 -.43 -.47
(Russia=1) (11.5)⁎⁎⁎ (10)⁎⁎⁎ (4.2)⁎⁎⁎ (3.7)⁎⁎⁎ (.07)⁎⁎⁎ (.06)⁎⁎⁎
Mean of outcome 252 249 641 639 7.71 7.73
R2 .58 0.58 0.93 0.93 .30 0.31
Municipalities 301 373 301 373 301 373
Panel B: Quadratic polynomial in distance
Partition effect 8.9 6.8 8.9 6.2 0.03 0.05
(Russia=1) (20.1) (18.7) (17.4) (16.3) (.12) (.11)
Mean of outcome 252 249 641 639 7.71 7.73
R2 .30 0.30 0.37 0.36 .34 0.35
Municipalities 301 373 301 373 301 373
The Russian - Prussian border
Panel C : Quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude
Partition effect −4 −10.6 −1.9 −3.5 0.4 0.9
(Russia=1) (3.3) (3.03)⁎⁎⁎ (2.2) (1.8)* (.02)* (.02)⁎⁎⁎
Mean of outcome 115 113 540 539 8.01 8.01
R2 .83 0.81 0.85 0.84 .95 0.94
Municipalities 206 302 206 302 206 302
Panel D : Quadratic polynomial in distance
Partition effect −5.6 −6.7 −3.5 −8.4 −0.01 0.7
(Russia=1) (10.8) (9.8) (8.4) (7) (.14) (.11)
Mean of outcome 115 113 540 539 8.01 8.01
R2 .09 0.07 0.02 0.03 .05 0.03
Municipalities 206 302 206 302 206 302
Sample Rural All Rural All Rural All
Notes: Robust and clustered standard errors (at municipality level) are reported in the parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 0,1% level, ** at
the 1% level and * at the 5%. Columns 1 to 2 - the dependent variable is the average altitude in meters; Columns 3 to 4 - the average annual
precipitation in millimetres; Columns 5 to 6 - the average annual temperature in Celsius degrees. Table presents estimates of the coefficient β from
the regression 1) of the dependent variable on the partition dummy D, which equals 1 for the former Russian areas and 0 for either the former
Austrian (Panel A, C) or Prussian (Panel B, D) territories. In addition, the regressions include a quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude (Panel
A, B) or a quadratic polynomial in distance (Panel C, D). All the regressions use 50 km bandwidth.
28 Consistent with Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya (2015), the one-dimensional specification in Table 4 Panel B and Panel D does not produce sig-
nificant differences on either of the borders.
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When the border exogeneity assumption is satisfied, estimation of the discontinuous change in the outcome variable at the
borders yields a causal effect of the Partitions of Poland. The channel of influence might be through social norms, migration or other
processes induced by the Partitions.
3.4. Results
Figs. 5and 6 present the relationships between the average student performance and distance to the Austrian-Russian and
Prussian-Russian borders respectively. A drop in the 6th and 9th grade exam score can be seen clearly at the border between Austria
and Russia indicating a strong and positive effect of the former Austrian Empire. Contrary to this, no visible effect can be seen on the
Prussian-Russian border.
In Table 5, I report the coefficients and standard errors for the baseline model (with quadratic polynomial and 50km bandwidth).
Panels A and C show the two-dimensional specification. Columns 1 to 4 present regressions with the 6th grade low-stakes exam score
as a dependent variable, while Columns 5 to 8 with the mathematics and science 9th grade high-stakes exam score. The results for the
rural sample are reported in Columns 1, 2, 5 and 6. Additionally, in Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8, I control for the set of geographic control
variables.
Panel A presents the results for 301 rural municipalities located around the former Russian-Austrian border. Students living in the
former Austrian partition outperform students from the former Russian side of the border on the 6th grade exam by on average 0.62
of standard deviations (σ)29 and on the 9th grade exam by 0.42σ (Columns 1 and 5). All the coefficients are strongly significant. The
magnitudes and economic importance of the results are comparable to the Black vs. White achievement gap in the US (Lee et al.,
2007). The estimates drop to 0.54σ and 0.4σ respectively, once I add the set of geographic control variables (Columns 2 and 6). The
smaller effects on the 9th grade high-stakes exam are consistent with the social norm hypothesis, which predicts that the gap between
regions with different social norms will widen when there are no intrinsic incentives for obtaining a good score (see Section 4.1).
Similarly, Panel C depicts the same set of regressions for 206 municipalities from the former Russian-Prussian border. The
coefficients are much smaller in absolute terms and are all insignificant. The estimates of the effect of the Prussian Empire, for the 6th
grade exam (9th grade) are 0.03σ (0.07σ), and 0.06σ (0.13σ) when the geographic controls are included. Unlike for the Austrian-
Russian border, these results show that the students from the former Prussian zone do not perform better than those from the former
Russian territories. In fact, the estimated absolute effects of the Austrian Empire on the Russian-Austrian border are significantly
Fig. 5. One-dimensional regression discontinuity: the Austrian-Russian border. Note: the left panel of the graph shows the municipality averages of
the standardized 6th grade exam score from 2005 to 2011 plotted against distance to the Austrian-Russian border. The right panel shows analogous
graph for the municipality averages of the standardized 9th grade exam score 2005–2011. Negative distance is for the Austrian side. The graph plots
the rural municipalities only. Source: own visualization based on the Central Board of Examination data.
29 To obtain the effect of the Austrian or the Prussian Empires one simply changes the sign of the coefficients reported in Table 5.
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larger (at the 0.1% level) from the effects of the Prussian Empire on the Russian-Prussian border (the comparison is not reported).
This pattern is also visible in Fig. 7, which shows the modern map of Polish municipalities, along with the predicted values from
the two-dimensional regression of the standardized exam scores (Z-scores) from 2011, specified as in Columns 3 and 7 of Table 5.
Notably, the level of the predicted value is clearly discontinuous at the Russian-Austrian border, but the same is not true for the
Prussian-Russian border.
3.5. Robustness
The population size of municipalities might be endogenous with respect to the Partitions of Poland and thus limiting the sample
only to the rural areas would introduce a sample selection bias.30 Therefore, as a first robustness check, I estimate Eq. 1 on the total
sample. I also include categorical and continuous variables indicating the population size and density of a municipality. This is a less
preferable sample, since there are few large cities that have generally better student performance, and they might (by chance)
significantly improve the average performance of the partitions. Nevertheless, as Table 5, Columns 3, 4, 7 and 8 show, the results are
practically insensitive to the inclusion of the urban areas.
A two-dimensional polynomial is a natural way to model the relationship between location and outcome. However, Dell (2010)
argues that the multidimensional regression discontinuity design might lead to an over-fit of a model at a discontinuity. On that
account, I also run a one dimensional model, where f(locationi) from Eq. (1) is a polynomial in distance to either the Russian-Prussian
or Russian-Austrian borders. I allow this polynomial to have different coefficients for the two sides of the borders.31 I centre the
distance at the borders and define it such that on the Prussian or Austrian sides it is negative and on the Russian side positive. Panels
B and D of Table 5 show the results. For the Austrian-Russian border, the magnitudes are smaller in absolute terms and in the case of
9th grade score they also lose significance. For the Prussian-Russian border, the magnitudes increase in absolute terms, but they are
still insignificant (with the exception of Column 1).
The baseline results might be sensitive to the specification choices. Table A5 reports estimates of the Partitions’ effects for
different polynomials in latitude and longitude, along with different bandwidth choices. All regressions include the geographic
Fig. 6. One-dimensional regression discontinuity: the Prussian-Russian border. Note: the left panel of the graph shows the municipality averages of
the standardized 6th grade exam score from 2005 to 2011 plotted against distance to the Prussian-Russian border. The right panel shows analogous
graph for the municipality averages of the standardized 9th grade exam score 2005–2011. Negative distance is for the Prussian side. The graph plots
the rural municipalities only. Source: own visualization based on the Central Board of Examination data.
30 Suppose that the Austrian Empire positively affected the urban population growth. Limiting the sample only to municipalities smaller than 50
thousand people from both the former Austrian and Russian partitions means that I compare ”normal” municipalities from the Russian side with
relatively disadvantaged ones from the Austrian side.
31 This can be done by inclusion of the interaction term between the partition dummy and the polynomial.
P. Bukowski Journal of Comparative Economics xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
15
controls. For the Austrian-Russian border, the results consistently show highly significant and positive effects of the Austrian Empire
on student performance. The effect varies from 0.53σ to 0.67σ in the case of the 6th grade exam and from 0.31σ to 0.48σ in the case of
the 9th grade exam. The estimates on the Prussian-Russian border vary considerably across specifications. Importantly, the sign
changes once the bandwidth is increased to 75km and 100km, which indicates that students living in the Russian zone, in fact,
perform better than those from the Prussian zone. These contradict the findings from Table 5. Nevertheless, in most cases the
coefficients are not significant.
The same set of specification choices is examined with the total sample (Table A6) and with the one-dimensional regression
discontinuity design for the rural sample (Table A7). Both tables consistently show highly significant (except cubic and quartile
specifications in Table A7) and positive effects of the Austrian Empire. The results for the Prussian Empire are similar as previously.
In order to check whether the results are not driven by any particular year, I estimate the baseline Eq. (1) by OLS on the rural
sample for each year. Fig. 8 depicts the estimated Partitions effects for each year-sample, along with the 95% confidence intervals.
Similarly, as in the pooled sample, the effect of the Austrian Empire is consistently positive and significant in the case of the 6th grade
low-stakes exam and similar, but smaller, in the case of the 9th grade high-stakes exam. By contrast, the effect of the Prussian Empire
is null across years and types of exam.
Next, I check whether the results are sensitive to an inclusion of a set of time-variant modern general education controls (local
government expenditure per capita on education, and kindergarten and secondary school attendance) and a set of modern socio-
economic controls (local government total expenditure per capita, unemployment ratio, population level, population density, school
density and migration balance). Table A1 provides definitions of these variables. These covariates are endogenous, that is, they are
Table 5
Baseline regressions.
Dep. Variable: 6th grade low-stakes exam 9th grade high-stakes exam
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
The Russian - Austrian border
Panel A : Quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude
Partitions effect −.637 −.561 −.615 −.554 −.432 −.409 −.404 −.402
(Russia=1) (.119)⁎⁎⁎ (.125)⁎⁎⁎ (.107)⁎⁎⁎ (.116)⁎⁎⁎ (.116)⁎⁎⁎ (.131)⁎⁎ (.104)⁎⁎⁎ (.122)⁎⁎⁎
Mean of outcome .1 0.1 0.19 0.19 0.02 0.02 0.1 0.1
R2 .26 0.3 0.28 0.32 0.19 0.2 0.21 0.22
Municipalities 301 301 373 373 301 301 373 373
Mun. × Time 2107 2107 2606 2606 2106 2106 2605 2600
Panel B: Quadratic polynomial in distance
Partitions effect −.45 −.483 −.493 −.502 −.231 −.273 −.343 −.357
(Russia=1) (.256)+ (.235)* (.234)* (.215)* (.229) (.217) (.231) (.217)
R2 .14 0.19 0.2 0.24 0.09 0.16 0.15 0.2
Mean of outcome .1 0.1 0.19 0.19 0.02 0.02 0.1 0.1
Municipalities 301 301 373 373 301 301 373 373
Mun. × Time 2107 2107 2606 2606 2106 2106 2605 2605
The Russian - Prussian border
Panel C : Quadratic Polynomial in latitude and longitude
Partitions effect −.035 −.059 −.134 −.153 −.072 −.132 −.042 −.09
(Russia=1) (.156) (.156) (.125) (.128) (.172) (.169) (.131) (.132)
Mean of outcome −.22 −.22 −.15 −.15 −.04 −.04 −.03 −.03
R2 .06 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.14
Municipalities 206 206 302 302 206 206 302 302
Mun. × Time 1442 1442 2114 2114 1442 1442 2114 2114
Panel D : Quadratic polynomial in distance
Partitions effect −.405 −.384 −.334 −.334 −.144 −.118 −.135 −.126
(Russia=1) (.237)+ (.24) (.204) (.203)+ (.24) (.249) (.188) (.195)
R2 .04 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.1
Mean of outcome −.22 −.22 −.15 −.15 −.04 −.04 −.03 −.03
Municipalities 206 206 302 302 206 206 302 302
Mun. × Time 1442 1442 2114 2114 1442 1442 2114 2114
Geo. controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Sample Rural Rural All All Rural Rural All All
Notes: Robust and clustered standard errors (at municipality level) are reported in the parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 0,1% level, ** at
the 1% level, * at the 5% and + at the 10%. Columns 1 to 3 - the dependent variables are the 6th grade low-stakes exam score; Columns 4 to 6 - the
mathematics and science 9th grade high-stakes exam score. Table presents estimates of the coefficient β from the regression 1 of the dependent
variable on the partition dummy D, which equals 1 for the former Russian areas and 0 for either the former Austrian (Panel A, B) or Prussian (Panel
C, D) territories. In addition, the regressions include a quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude (Panel A, C) or a quadratic polynomial in
distance (Panel B, D), and a set of geographic covariates (columns 2,4, 6 and 8). All the regressions use 50 km bandwidth.
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also affected by the Partitions of Poland (see Section 4.3 and Table 6). The augmented regression, therefore, ”switches off” some
potential channels of influence of the Partitions on outcomes and leads to bad-control bias (Angrist and Pischke, 2008).32 Indeed, as
reported in Table A8, the effect of the Austrian Partition drops slightly, but remains significant and large. Depending on polynomial
and bandwidth, the estimated coefficients range from 0.36σ to 0.45σ in the case of the 6th grade exam and from 0.2σ to 0.32σ in the
case of the 9th grade exam. On the other hand, the estimates of the effect of the Prussian Partition are not significant and sometimes
have an opposite sign.
The current border between voivodeships (NUTS2 administration level) overlaps almost completely with the former Russian-
Austrian border. If voivodeships influence the quality of education, their effect could be mistakenly confounded with the effect of the
Austrian or Russian Partition. There are two arguments against this possibility. Firstly, the Polish education system is considered
highly decentralized (Herbst et al., 2009). A local municipality’s government manages the school network of public elementary and
lower secondary schools, and the role of the central government is limited to financing education and enacting general resolutions.
Moreover, voivodeship administration is irrelevant for the education governance. Consistently, there is no significant effect of the
Austrian Empire on municipalitys’ education spending per capita (Table 6). Secondly, since the former Russian-Prussian border does
not overlap with the administrative borders, I can include the voivodeship dummies in Eq. (1). None of these dummies are significant,
Table 6
Discontinuities with log of covariates as dependent variables.
Dep. Variable/Border: Prussian-Russian Austrian-Russian
(1) (2)
Panel A : Time-variant variables
Expenditure .029 .092
(.051) (.051)
Education expenditure 0.079 .03
(.051) (.049)
Unemployment rate .104 −.223
(.082) (.063)⁎⁎⁎
Sec. school scholarization .056 .036
(.040) (.020)+
Population −.204 −.407
(.128) (.124)⁎⁎⁎
Population 0–18 .011 −.054
(.015) (.015)⁎⁎⁎
Population density .144 −.249
(.091) (.084)⁎⁎
Elementary schools per km2 .235 −.104
(.094)* (.084)
Secondary schools per km2 .219 −.136
(.104)* (.082)
Municipalities 206 301
Municipalities × Time 1442 2105
Panel B : Time-invariant variables
Agriculture −.875 .110
(.304)⁎⁎⁎ (.262)
Higher education −.042 −.154
(.069) (.060)⁎⁎⁎
Additional classes .057 .119
(.110) (.103)
Class size −.111 −.037
(.039)⁎⁎⁎ (.038)
Education Value Added 0.074 0.004
(.419) (.298)
Municipalities 206 298
Geographic controls Yes Yes
Sample Rural Rural
Notes: Robust and clustered standard errors (at municipality level) are reported in the parentheses. *** denotes
significance at the 0.1% level, ** at the 1% level and * at the 5%. Table presents estimates of the coefficient β
from the regression 1 of logarithms of various dependent variables (except education value added) on the par-
tition dummy D, which equals 1 for the former Russian areas and 0 for either the former Austrian (column 2) or
Prussian (column 1). Column 1 shows the effect of the Russian Empire for the Prussian-Russian border, Column 2
for the Austrian-Russian. In addition, the regressions include a quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude
and geographic covariates. The dependent variables are explained in Table A1. All the regressions use 50 km
bandwidth.
32 However, the direction of the bias is not clear.
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Fig. 7. Predicted levels of the 6th and 9th grade exam scores for 2011. Note: the map shows the predicted values of the 6th and 9th grade exam Z-
score for 2011, based on the regressions specified im Eq. 1, using the whole sample, and including a quadratic polynomial of longitude and latitude,
the partition dummy, geographic covariates and a set of population size dummies. The borders of the Partitions of Poland are layered on the modern
map of Poland. The border under investigation are marked by the solid line, the excluded borders are marked by the dashed line. Source: own
visualization based on the Central Board of Examination data and GIS maps from Kashin and Ziblatt (2012) and MPIDR and CGG (2012).
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suggesting that a voivodeship administration is not relevant for the performance of students. This observation is also consistent with
Herbst (2004).
Finally, I run a set of placebo experiments in which I estimate the baseline regression at an artificial border, which I create by
moving step-by-step the actual Austrian-Russian border by 5km to the North or to the South (at most around 100 km). I define the
”Russian” dummy as an area north of the artificial borders. Fig. 9, Panel A presents Z-tests33 of the placebo Partitions effects for each
artificial border. Notably, only the actual border (at point 0) is an outlier. Analogously, I move step-by-step the Prussian-Russian
border by 5km to the West or to the East (at most around 100km) and define the ”Russian” dummy as an area east of the artificial
borders. Fig. 9, Panel B shows Z-tests. This time the actual border is not different from the other artificial borders.
As discussed in Section 3.3, the Partitions’ borders were set along rivers (the Drw’ca, the Prosna and the Vistula) and there are
minor differences in geographic characteristics across the Austrian-Russian border. The rivers might separate regions with, for in-
stance, different urbanization patterns, leading to differences in student performance. In order to investigate this possibility, I run
four placebo experiments, with artificial borders set on other rivers in Poland. I chose two artificial river borders with East-West
orientation similar to the Austrian-Russian border. The first one goes along the Bug, Vistula and Bzura rivers; the second along the
Wieprz, Vistula and Pilica rivers. Similarly, I selected two artificial borders with North-South orientation similar to the Prussian-
Russian border. The first is located on the Narew, Bug, Vistula and Pilica rivers. The second along the Odra river. In all cases, the
effect of the placebo ”Russian” dummy was insignificant, which strongly suggests that the rivers are unlikely to drive my results
(results available upon request).
Taken together, these results show that the former Austrian Empire has a positive effect on the exam scores once compared with
the Russian Empire. The effect is stable across specification, highly significant and large. Conversely, the effect of the former Prussian
Empire is usually insignificant, small and changes sign across specifications.
Fig. 8. The Partitions effect year-by-year. Note: the figures present the OLS estimations of Eq. 1 based on the rural sample, for each year separately,
including a quadratic polynomial of longitude and latitude and geographic control variables. Only the coefficients and confidence intervals of the
Partitions dummy (the variable of interest) are presented. The dummy takes value one for the former Russian areas and zero for either the former
Austrian or Prussian areas. Source: author’s computation using the Central Board of Examination data.
33 Z-test is defined as a ratio of an estimated coefficient and a corresponding robust standard error. This is an asymptotic analogue to the classic T-
test. Z-test has an asymptotic Normal distribution.
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4. Channels of persistence
In this section I investigate the channels of persistence. There are many possible explanations of the observed pattern in exam
scores. I highlight the social norms channel, which other studies also suggest to be the most important.34 In particular, the existing
literature on the long-lasting effects of the Central and Eastern European Empires underlines the importance of the inter-generational
transmission of norms and values. Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya (2015) provide evidence that the Partitions of Poland has exerted a long-
lasting effect on religiosity and belief in democratic values through the inter-generational within-family transmission of social norms.
More broadly, Becker et al. (2016) and Karaja (2013) show that the government polices introduced by the Hapsburg and Ottoman
Empires still affect trust toward local state and acceptance of corruption. My results show that people living in the former Austrian
Empire have a more positive social norm with respect to their local education system, even though they do not necessarily have a more
positive general social norm toward intelligence and higher (non-local) education. I also discuss alternative channels, in particular,
skill-biased migration and urbanization patterns.
4.1. Social norms toward local education system
I provide four pieces of empirical evidence to argue that the Partitions of Poland have created different social norms toward the
local education system. Although neither of them would be persuasive in isolation, when taken together they suggest that social norm
is an important transmission mechanism of past institutions. Firstly, I develop a simple, norm-based model of student schooling
efforts, which is consistent with my finding that the effect of the Austrian Empire is larger in the case of the low-stakes exam then in
the case of the high-stakes one. Secondly, I use the data on proxies for social values to directly compare people’s attitudes toward
Fig. 9. The placebo experiments. Note: In Panel A, I artificially move step-by-step the Austrian-Russian border by 5km to the north and to the south
(negative distance). In Panel B, I artificially move step-by-step the Prussian-Russian border by 5km to the west and to the east (negative distance).
For each placebo border, I calculate the Z-test (ratio of a coefficient and a corresponding robust standard errors) for the placebo Partitions dummy
coefficient from the baseline specification of Eq. 1. Source: author’s computation using the Central Board of Examination data.
34 See, for instance, Putnam et al. (1994), Akerlof and Kranton (2010), Cassar et al. (2014), Sakalli (2018), and Feir (2016).
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education across the former Partition borders. Thirdly, I show that the Austrian partition has a positive and large effect on kin-
dergarten attendance, which cannot be explained by the historical supply of kindergartens. Finally, consistent with the general social-
norm channel, I provide evidence for the strong effect of the Partitions on political outcomes, namely voter turnout and pro-EU votes.
4.1.1. Low-stakes vs. high-stakes exams
Suppose that the test score Tig of student i from grade g is a function of a student’s effort eig (which summarizes all input into
education) of other grade-invariant characteristics Xi and of an idiosyncratic shock ϵig. Then:= + + +T e Xig ig i ig
I follow (Akerlof and Kranton, 2002) and model the level of schooling effort as a function of standard pecuniary incentives (such
as the direct costs and benefits of education) and social-norm based incentives, penalizing the individual for not coping with the
existing social norm:
=U e p we e p e E( ) ( 1
2
) (1 ) 1
2
( )2 2 (2)
where e is the amount of schooling effort, w is wage rate per unit of effort, parameter p is weight given to pecuniary benefits and costs
of effort, and E is the social reference point (social norm) with respect to the level of effort. In this formulation, the optimal choice of
effort depends on economic forces and social expectations.
Next, consider a minor modification of the student utility function outlined above. Suppose there are two regions R: former
Austria and Russia, and that they differ with respect to the social norm toward schooling effort E(R). There is also a common social
norm toward the future earnings A, which can be arbitrarily large.
In the maximization problem for the 9th grade high-stakes exam score, a student chooses a level of effort, which maximizes the
following utility function:
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The optimal level of schooling effort is given by:
= + ++e pw p E R wAp w* (1 )( ( ) )1 (1 )i9 2
Assuming that E(Austria)> E(Russia), the average difference in the level of effort for the former Austria and Russia is:
= = + >GAP e e p E AUS E RUSp w* * (1 )( ( ) ( ))1 (1 ) 0AUS RUS9 ,9 ,9 2
In the case of the 6th grade low-stakes exam score, the maximization problem is simpler. This exam score does not matter for the
future education career, therefore it will not have an impact on the future wages. The utility function and the first order condition are
thus:
=U e p e p e E R( ) 1
2
(1 ) 1
2
( ( ))i i62 6 2
=e p E R* (1 ) ( )i6
The gap between the regions in the level of effort is then:= = >GAP e e p E AUS E RUS* * (1 )( ( ) ( )) 0AUS RUS6 ,6 ,6
Since + >p w1 (1 ) 1,2 it follows that GAP6th>GAP9th, as long as p<1. Under the assumption that the exogenous students’
characteristics are similar around the border,35 I conclude that:> >T T T T¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ 0Austria Russia Austria Russia,6 ,6 ,9 ,9
This is consistent with the empirical results presented in Section 3, namely that the effect of the Austrian Empire is larger in the
case of low-stakes exams, than in the case of high-stakes exams (Table 5 ). In the case of the Prussian-Russian border, there is no
difference in social norms (i.e. =E Prussia E Russia( ) ( )), so there is no gap in the performance of students.
4.1.2. Proxies for social norms
I use survey data on attitudes toward education to check whether current social norms systematically differ across the historical
borders of the Partitions of Poland. The primary source of the data is the two waves (2011 and 2013) of the Social Diagnosis survey
(Czapiński and Panek, 2013), which include data from over 45,000 individuals from almost all counties in Poland. The data does not
offer direct measures of social norms with respect to local schools. Nevertheless, the questionnaire asks whether education is im-
portant for a good life, whether respondents are satisfied with the education they have received and their desired level of education
35 This is a stronger assumption than in the case of the regression discontinuity design.
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for their children. The variables are described in Table A3. A second source, with a smaller sample size, is the two waves (2006 and
2010) of the Life in Transition Survey (LiTS, organized by the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development), which includes
around 7000 individuals from 350 primary sampling units (PSU) from Poland and asks questions about the priority of education in
governmental spending, private expenditure on education and opinions on the role of intelligence and skills in life success. A third
source is the first wave (2010) of the Education Value Added survey (Dolata et al., 2013; 2015) (EVA, conducted by the Education
Research Institute in Warsaw), which includes approximately 10,000 parents and asks about the role of family tradition in school
selection. For detailed descriptions of the variables from the LiTS and EVA, see Table A2.
As the Social Diagnosis survey covers almost all counties in Poland, I can use a geographical regression discontinuity design,
where location of a respondent i is determined by centroid of her county c. The estimated equation is:= + + + + + +y f location D G X( )ic c c ic c w ic (3)
where notation is as in Eq. (1). Additionally, I control for a set of county-level socio-economic characteristics Xc, which are described
in Table A1. I pool the two waves of the survey (cross-sections) and include wave fixed effects κw. Since there are fewer counties
(NUTS4) than municipalities (NUTS5), and to ensure enough statistical power, I use the total sample, and expand the bandwidth to
100km. I employ a one -dimensional polynomial in distance in order to avoid an over-fit of the model. Depending on the outcome
variable, I use Probit or Ordered Logit estimators.
In the case of the LiTS and EVA surveys, the samples are based on only several PSUs that are located near the former borders of the
Partitions. I use Eq. 3, with the whole sample and 100km bandwidth, but in this case, I do not include a polynomial in location or
distance.36 Beyond this limitation, one should keep in mind that the LiTS and EVA samples are not representative at the regional
level. Depending on the outcome variable, I use OLS, Probit or Ordered Logit estimators.
Table 7 presents estimates of the effect of the Partitions of Poland using the sample from Social Diagnosis and the reported
numbers are the marginal effects at the border. Table 8 reports the average marginal treatment effects from the LiTS and EVA
samples. The results show that people living in the former Austrian partition are around 5pp. more likely to say that education is
important for a good life (Table 7, Columns 1 and 2) and around 24pp. more likely to say that public education should be given first
or second priority in governmental spending (Table 8, Column 2, but 1 is insignificant). They are also 5pp. more likely to claim that
family tradition is important in their local school choice (Table 8, Columns 7 and 8). However, at the same time, they are around
20pp. less likely to desire higher education for their children (Table 7, Columns 5 and 6) and 22pp. less likely to agree that intelligence
and skills are important in life success (Table 8, Columns 3 and 4). Finally, the sign of insignificant estimates suggests that people
from the Austrian partition are more satisfied with the education they received (Table 7, Columns 3 and 4), but spend less on the
education of their children (Table 8, Columns 5 and 6).
These results can be interpreted as evidence for a positive social norm toward local education institutions. People from the former
Austrian Empire perceive education as important in their life, want more funds directed to public schools37 and underscore the long-
run relationships of their families with local schools.38 On the other hand, their attachment to local schools might lead to a lower trust
in non-local ones. This would explain why people desire less to send their children to an institution of higher education, which is
usually located outside their local communities. Nevertheless, they also perceive intelligence and skills as less important and, even
though they might look at these outside the education context, this is clearly a puzzling result. Overall, in light of the model outlined
in the previous section, one could argue that people living in the former Austrian Empire have higher social norms toward schooling
effort in local schools, that is E(Austria)> E(Russia), but lower social norms toward the expected future career and earnings
A(Austria)<A(Russia).
In the case of the Prussian-Russian border, the only significant estimates show that people from the Prussian partition are less
likely to agree that education is important for a good life, but more likely to agree that intelligence or skills are important in life
success. These would suggest that there is also a small difference in social norms, that is, E(Prussia)< E(Russia) and
A(Prussia)>A(Russia), however, these seem to be too small to produce strong and systematic differences in the performance of
students.
4.1.3. Kindergarten attendance
The third piece of evidence shows that the Austrian Partition has a positive and significant effect on kindergarten attendance.
Table 9 presents the estimates of the border discontinuities in kindergarten attendance, defined as the share of children aged 3–5 who
attend an institution of pre-education. I use the regressions specified as in Eq. (1).39 The results show that the kindergarten atten-
dance ratio is higher on the Austrian side by 3–8 pp compared to the Russian side. On the other hand, there is no significant difference
36 The reason for not using a regression discontinuity is that there are only a few locations around the borders and one might over-fit the model.
37 The stronger belief about the priority of education in governmental spending in the Austrian partition can be alternatively explained by the poor
quality of local public education. However, if this is the case we would rather observe a negative impact of the Austrian Empire on the exam scores.
The results show the opposite. Moreover, there is no systematic difference between the Austrian and Russian partition in terms of school infra-
structure, as reported in Herczynski and Sobotka (2013), and there is no visible effect of the Partitions of Poland on the estimates of school value
added (see Table 6).
38 Interestingly, parents from the Austrian partition are also 5pp. more likely to agree that corporal punishment is important for child development
(Table 7, column 7). This suggests that they are also more conservative than parents from the Russian partition.
39 Variables are at the municipality level. In all the regressions I use 50 km bandwidth and quadratic polynomial in longitude and latitude. I pool
years and use a random effect estimator.
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on the Prussian-Russian border.
This effect could be a result of the historically determined demand for pre-education or the historical supply of institutions of pre-
education. This later explanation implies that the higher kindergarten attendance in the former Austrian partition is due to the
inherited buildings or institutions from the 19th century. Unfortunately, no data exist to test this hypothesis. Nevertheless, if this
Table 7
Proxies for social norms: Social Diagnosis Survey (marginal effects at the border).
Dep. Variable: Education - important for a
good life (1=yes)
Satisfied with received
education (1=yes)
University as a desired degree
for a child (1=yes)
Agree that corporal punishment is
important for a child dev. (3=no)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
The Russian - Austrian border
Partitions effect −.047 −.054 −.031 −.065 .176 0.22 0.053 0.133
(Russia=1) (.022)* (.021)⁎⁎ (.046) (.044) (.083)* (.072)⁎⁎ (.008)⁎⁎⁎ (.04)⁎⁎⁎
Mean of outcome 0.06 0.06 0.27 0.27 0.81 0.81 2.4 2.4
R2 0.16 0.16 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.02
Observations 8364 8364 8259 8259 2496 2496 8351 8351
The Russian - Prussian border
Partitions effect .038 0.033 −.052 −.074 0.038 .083 −.128 −.102
(Russia=1) (.016)* (.017)* (.059) (.057) (.086) (.087) (.035)⁎⁎⁎ (.038)⁎⁎
Mean of outcome 0.06 0.06 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.75 2.3 2.3
R2 .15 0.15 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.091 0.01 0.02
Observations 7853 7853 7763 7763 2149 2149 7884 7884
Background controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Modern controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Sample All All All All All All All All
Estimator Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit OLogit OLogit
Notes: Robust and clustered standard errors (at county level) are reported in the parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 0,1% level, ** at the 1%
level, * at the 5% and + at the 10%. Table presents estimates of the marginal effects at the border of the coefficient β from the regression 1 of the
dependent variable on the partition dummy D, which equals 1 for the former Russian areas and 0 for either the former Austrian or Prussian
territories. In addition, the regressions include a quadratic polynomial of distance and a set of exogenous and endogenous covariates. The dependent
variables are described in Table A3. The control variables are listed and explained in Table A1. All the regressions use 100 km bandwidth.
Table 8
Proxies for social norms: LiTS and EVA (the average marginal effects).
Dep. Variable: First or second priority of governmental
spending on public education (1=yes)
Intelligence and skills important
in life success (1=yes)
Log spending on
educations
Family tradition important in
school selection (1=yes)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
The Russian - Austrian border
Partitions effect −.085 −.24 .08 0.22 .184 0.683 −.051 −.053
(Russia=1) (.082) (.128)+ (.066) (.062)⁎⁎⁎ (.224) (.313)* (.032)+ (.053)
Mean of outcome 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.32 - - 0.24 0.24
R2 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.16 0.25 0.01 0.03
Observations 602 602 602 587 233 233 802 802
The Russian - Prussian border
Partitions effect .08 −.08 −.07 −.378 0.23 -1.24 0.029 −.015
(Russia=1) (.05) (.137) (.067) (.201)+ (.265) (1.85) (.026) (.031)
Mean of outcome 0.31 0.31 0.35 0.35 − - 0.22 0.22
R2 .08 0.1 0.03 0.1 0.3 0.37 0.01 0.05
Observations 461 461 461 461 166 166 1050 1050
Background controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Modern controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Sample All All All All All All All All
Estimator Probit Probit Probit Probit OLS OLS Probit Probit
Source LiTS LiTS LiTS LiTS LiTS LiTS EVA EVA
Notes: Robust and clustered standard errors (at county level) are reported in the parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 0,1% level, ** at the 1%
level , * at the 5% and + at the 10%. Table presents estimates of the average marginal effects of the coefficient β from the regression (1) of the
dependent variable on the partition dummy D, which equals 1 for the former Russian areas and 0 for either the former Austrian or Prussian
territories. Because the sample consists of randomly selected PSU, the regressions does not include any polynomial of location or distance. The
dependent variables are described in Table A2. The control variables are listed and explained in Table A1. Geographic controls are not included in
the regressions based on EVA (Columns 7 and 8) because of the PSUs’ anonymity. All the regressions use 100 km bandwidth and include wave fixed
effects.
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were true, we would also observe a positive impact of the Prussian Empire as the historical school network was denser in the Prussian
partition (see Table 2). As this section shows, this is not the case.
On the other hand, historically determined demand for pre-education is consistent with the social-norm channel. Pre-education is
not obligatory in Poland and it is partially determined by parents’ willingness to send their children to kindergartens. The higher
social norm toward a local education system, including local kindergartens, can thus explain the positive effect of the Austrian Empire
on kindergarten attendance.
4.1.4. Political outcomes
The final piece of evidence does not directly look at education, but explores, in general, whether the Partitions can have persisted
through social norms. Political outcomes are particularly useful, as they are known to be affected not only by economic factors, but
also underlying norms and beliefs (Greenstein, 1969; Moon, 1992; Denny and Doyle, 2008; Graham et al., 2009). In particular, I focus
on the effect of the Partitions on voter turnout and votes in favour of EU accession.40 The former is a proxy of active citizenship,
which is likely to be high if people believe that democracy and political institutions matter. Support for EU accession is likely to be
affected by positive social norms towards ”external” powers. How could the Partitions of Poland affect these norms and beliefs? The
Poles living in the Prussian and Austrian Empires could participate in elections and choose their representatives in the national
assemblies. Thirteen elections took place in Prussia between 1871 and 1912, and eleven in Austria between 1849 and 1911. On these
occasions, Polish national leaders and circles wanted to politically activate the Poles by portraying voting as an act of patriotism
(Wojciak, 1981; Trzeciakowski, 2003; Ilski, 2008). In contrast, in the Russian Empire only two elections took place, in 1906–1907,
and 1912, providing a limited chance for Poles to fight for autonomy through politics. These suggest that the longer tradition of
electoral activism on the former Prussian and Austrian territories, compared to the former Russian, might have a positive effect on
willingness to vote. On the other hand, the hostility of the Prussian and Russian Empires towards Poles and the relative tolerance of
the Austrian Empire suggest that living in the latter might have a positive effect on inhabitants’ acceptance of the ”rules of Brussels”
and thus on pro-EU votes.
I test these hypotheses by estimating the baseline model described in Eq. (1), but where outcome variables are turnout in pre-
sidential (2000, 2005, 2010), parliamentary (2015) and local (1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014) elections, as well as the turnout and
results of the EU referendum in 2003. Since urbanization might affect political behaviour, I include controls for population size and
density. The data comes from the Polish National Electoral Commission, and Table 10 presents the results. The Russian Partition has a
negative, strong and significant effect on voter turnout for the presidential and parliamentary elections, as well as the EU referendum.
Crossing the Austrian (Prussian)-Russian border leads to a lower turnout of around 4 (2.75) percentage points for presidential
elections, 3.6 (3.2) percentage points for the parliamentary election and 6.8 (5) percentage points for the EU referendum. These
results are consistent with Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya (2015). Interestingly, turnout in the local elections in the former Russian
partition is 2.85pp higher than in the Austrian partition and around 3.5pp higher than in the Prussian partition. As for the results of
the EU referendum, those living in the former Austrian part are more likely to cast pro-EU votes by almost 10pp, compared to the
former Russian partition (baseline is 61–62%). The effect is strongly significant. On the other hand, there is no difference in pro-EU
voting on the Prussian-Russian border.
The higher turnout in the central-governance elections (presidential, parliamentary and referendum) in the Austrian and Prussian
partitions, and the lower turnout in the local-government elections, is partially consistent with the social-norm hypothesis. In the
19th century, Poles were governed by three different central powers, but today they share same president and parliament and thus
differences in voter turnout might not arise from different qualities of government, but rather from heterogeneous social norms
towards political participation. The rule of law and frequent elections in the Austrian and Prussian Empires created positive norms
and trust towards central democratic institutions (Becker et al., 2016) and people perceive the central level as more important than
the local. On the other hand, the absolutist and undemocratic rules of the Russian Empire shifted people’s attention towards local
governments. An alternative explanation could be that local governments are somehow different in the former Russian partition
leading to different political participation. But this would imply that they are either more efficient (so people perceive them as
important) or less inefficient (so people want to replace them). More research is needed to fully explore this possibility.
The positive effect of the Austrian Empire on the number of pro-EU votes is fully consistent with the social-norm hypothesis. As
discussed in Section 2, the Hapsburgs were relatively tolerant and allow Poles much autonomy, which might have engendered trust in
”external” forces and raised the acceptance of the EU.41 This finding thus points to the interaction between identity and institutions as
an important condition for the long-run persistence of institutions. The next chapter discusses this implication in more depth.
4.2. Migration
Modern skill-biased migration might be an alternative explanation of the observed positive effect of the Austrian Partition. If, for
instance, only high achievers migrate to the former Austrian partition and only low achievers to the former Russian partition, one
40 For more about the effect of the Partitions of Poland on political outcomes see Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya (2015), Kowalski (2000), and
Zarycki (2007).
41 An alternative explanation based on norms is that the higher pro-EU votes are an outcome of the higher quality of human capital (performance
of students) in the former Austrian partition. However, including student performance from 2005 (not available for 2003) into the regression did not
change the effect.
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should expect to find a significant gap in the average student performance.42 In order to evaluate this possibility, I follow (Dell, 2010)
and exploit the student-level data on exam scores (from the Central Examination Board) and adjust it for the municipality-level data
on the share of in-migrants (from the Central Statistical Office of Poland). Specifically, I assume the ”worst” migration scenario
outlined above and on the former Austrian lands I trim the top of the distribution of the student exam scores according to the share of
in-comers at the municipality level. Analogously, on the former Russian lands I trim the bottom of the distribution. Next, I aggregate
the trimmed data to the municipality level and repeat the estimations from Section 3.4 (the baseline specification of the Eq. (1)). By
construction, the effect of the Austrian Partition for the 6th (9th) grade score drops from 0.62σ to 0.47σ (0.44σ to 0.28σ), but it still
remains highly significant and economically relevant.43 The results thus show that modern migration itself is unlikely to explain the
observed effect of the Partitions.
Nevertheless, the effect might be driven by historical migration if the selection of migrants was not orthogonal to the current
performance of students. My main results could be, for instance, explained by the migration of high-skilled people from the Russian to
Austrian parts (or vice versa for the low-skilled) and/or migration of low-skilled people from the Austrian part to third countries.
Existing qualitative evidence suggests that the first possibility is unlikely. Labuda (1971) argued that the majority of migrants
between the partitions had been seasonal workers, who did not settle permanently.44 Moreover, the economic situation in Galicia was
the hardest and the level of industrialization the lowest of the areas in question, so there were no strong incentives for skilled workers
to migrate there. On the other hand, migration to third countries is harder to assess, as there are no clear insights in the literature
about 19th century emigrants’ skills from partitioned Poland. Zubrzycki (1953) hypothesizes that migrants from the Grand Duchy of
Poznań were more likely to be educated than migrants from Galicia and the Congress Kingdom.45 However, as reported in
Abramitzky et al. (2014), late 19th century U.S. immigrants from Austria and Prussia had wages similar to the US population, even
though there was substantial variation in wages between immigrants coming from other European countries.
GUS (2003) and Zubrzycki (1953) offer limited aggregated data about migration and population characteristics from the 19th and
early 20th century. In Table 11, Panel A presents the migration balance and Panel B presents migration as a share of the 1910
population for each partition. The numbers show a large outflow of population from the Austrian and Prussian parts. Importantly,
however, the Austrian partition does not seem to be unique and, in fact, migration was larger in the Prussian partition. A similar
picture emerges from the data on general population characteristics (Panels C and D). The population trends and age structures are
similar across the partitions and the Austrian part does not show any migration-related anomalies, for instance, the over or under
representation of the middle-aged population group.
The post-World War II forced displacement of Poles may have erased the effect of the Prussian Empire. This migration was from
the eastern parts of interwar Poland to the newly joined post-German areas in the west and north of modern Poland (see Fig. 1). At the
same time, Germans were expelled to Germany, leaving their houses and agriculture holdings behind. If the areas on the Prussian side
of the Prussian-Russian border had had a significant German minority before 1939, then the incoming Polish population may have
been more likely to settle there. I argue that this scenario is unlikely. In my analysis, I exclude Silesia and Eastern Prussia, which had
historically significant German populations and focus only on the areas with Polish majorities. In order to investigate the presence of
German minorities in the borderlands of interest, I use the 1931 Polish census data at the county level on the share of German
speakers (GUS, 1938).46 The upper part of Fig. 10 presents the geographic distribution of German speakers and the shaded areas mark
the 50km bandwidth around the former partitions’ borders. Table A9 presents the county-level average share of German speakers for
the same bandwidth. Even though Germans were concentrated in the former Prussian partition, there is no visible discontinuity at the
border with the Russian partition. The average share is 7.17% for the former Prussian borderlands and 6.28% for the former Russian,
and the difference is not significant. If anything, the share of Poles is lower on the Russian side. This is because the Congress Kingdom
had relatively a high share of Jews (see the lower part of Fig. 10 and Table A9).
4.3. Other channels
The Partitions of Poland may have persisted because of other differences between the Empires, such as urbanization, economic
policies or the expansion of universities. In order to shed light on these, I estimate the border discontinuities of various socio-
economic characteristics described in Table A1. I use the regressions specified in Eq. (1),47 but with the dependent variables
transformed to natural logarithms. Similarly to the exam scores, these variables are endogenous, and might reflect the effect of the
historical education systems or other channels.
42 Please note that the potential reasons for the migration might be endogenous with respect to the Partitions of Poland.
43 In a specification with the geographic control variables, the effect drops from 0.55σ to 0.41σ (0.42σ to 0.26σ). Full results available upon
request.
44 However, because of the universities, there was a small migration of students to the Austrian part but it was limited to Cracow and Lviv
(Cohen, 1996).
45 Nevertheless, given the size of migration (see Table 11), the majority of migrants were likely uneducated.
46 Unfortunately, to my best knowledge, there is no census-level data available on the share of displaced people. The census of 1950 provides
voivodeship-level data. However, the voivodeships on the Prussian side of the Prussian-Russian border include the areas joined to Poland after WWII
and thus the average shares are obviously higher there.
47 Variables are at the municipality level. In all the regressions, I use 50km bandwidth and quadratic polynomial in longitude and latitude, the
sample is limited to the rural areas, and only the partition dummy and geographic controls are included as independent variables. For the time-
varying variables I use a random effect estimator, for the time-invariant variables I use OLS.
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Table 6, Column 1 reports estimates of the effect (semi-elasticity) of the Russian Empire on the Prussian-Russian border, while
Column 2 reports the effect on the Austrian-Russian border; therefore, changing the sign yields either the effect of the Prussian or
Austrian Empire. The effect of the Partitions on the Prussian-Russian border is insignificant, except for the share of people in agri-
culture and class size.
The picture looks different in the case of the Austrian-Russian border. The Austrian Empire positively affects the demographic
characteristics, namely the level of population, density, and migration balance. Different urbanization patterns could be an alter-
native channel if they affect the quality of education. One mechanism could be through class size (Angrist and Lavy, 1999).48
Table 9
Kindergarten attendance.
Dep. Variable: Kindergarten attendance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
The Russian - Austrian border
Partitions effect −8.45 −5.48 −4.16 −6.28 −2.97 −8.84
(Russia=1) (2.33)⁎⁎⁎ (2.5)* (3.38) (2.09)⁎⁎ (2.29) (3.21)⁎⁎
Mean of outcome 47pp 47pp 47pp 51pp 51pp 51pp
R2 .21 0.21 0.4 0.34 0.35 0.5
Municipalities 301 301 301 373 373 373
Mun. × Time 2107 2107 2101 2611 2611 2606
The Russian - Prussian border
Partitions effect −3.81 −3.56 1.43 −2.75 -2.78 −2.89
(Russia=1) (3.06) (3.05) (3.53) (2.53) (2.53) (3.13)
Mean of outcome 48pp 48pp 48pp 52pp 52pp 52pp
R2 .36 0.36 0.54 0.41 0.41 0.55
Municipalities 206 206 206 302 302 302
Mun. × Time 1442 1442 1442 2114 2114 2114
Geo. controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Modern controls No No Yes No No Yes
Sample Rural Rural Rural All All All
Notes: Robust and clustered standard errors (at municipality level) are reported in the parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 0,1% level, ** at
the 1% level, * at the 5% and + at the 10%. The dependent variable is kindergarten attendance defined as pre-elementary schools’ attendance
divided by the number of children aged 3–5. Table presents estimates of the coefficient β from the regression (1) of the dependent variable on the
partition dummy D, which equals 1 for the former Russian areas and 0 for either the former Austrian (Panel A) or Prussian (Panel B) territories. The
regressions include a quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude, a set of geographic covariates (Columns 2 and 6) and a set of modern
covariates (Columns 3 and 7). The control variables are listed and explained in Table A1. All the regressions use 50 km bandwidth.
Table 10
Political outcomes.
Dep. Variable: Presidential elections -
Turnout
Parliamentary elections -
Turnout
Local elections -
Turnout
EU referendum - Turnout EU referendum - Votes
”yes”
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
The Russian - Austrian border
Partitions effect -3.17 −3.71 −2.67 −3.18 1.96 2.8 −5.76 −6.47 −8.89 −9.31
(Russia=1) (.99)⁎⁎⁎ (.87)⁎⁎⁎ (.96)⁎⁎ (.88)⁎⁎⁎ (1.12) (.963)⁎⁎ (.99)⁎⁎⁎ (.93)⁎⁎⁎ (1.74)⁎⁎⁎ (1.56)⁎⁎⁎
Mean of outcome 52 53 47 47 53 53 51 52 62 61
R2 0.59 0.60 0.61 0.58 0.22 0.21 0.55 0.57 0.51 0.5
Observations 903 1119 301 373 1505 1865 301 373 301 373
The Russian - Prussian border
Partitions effect −2.93 -2.35 −3.82 −2.35 3.78 2.38 −5.25 −4.73 −.07 −.12
(Russia=1) (.87)⁎⁎ (.72)⁎⁎⁎ (1.06)⁎⁎⁎ (.92)* (1.7)* (1.39) (1.04)⁎⁎⁎ (.88)⁎⁎⁎ (1.96) (1.7)
Mean of outcome 49 50 41 43 53 52 50 52 61 65
R2 .81 0.80 0.48 0.46 0.27 0.28 0.59 0.62 0.26 0.44
Observations 618 906 206 302 1030 1510 206 302 206 302
Geographic controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Sample Rural All Rural All Rural All Rural All Rural All
Notes: Robust and clustered standard errors (at municipality level) are reported in the parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 0,1% level, ** at
the 1% level, * at the 5% and + at the 10%. Table presents estimates of the coefficient β from the regression (1) of the dependent variable on the
partition dummy D, which equals 1 for the former Russian areas and 0 for either the former Austrian or Prussian territories. In addition, the
regressions include a quadratic polynomial of distance and a set of geographic covariates, population size and density. The dependent variables are
explained in Table A1. All the regressions use 50 km bandwidth.
48 But this scenario would rather imply that classes are larger on the former Austrian lands, and so the performance of students lower.
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However, as shown in Table 6, there is no difference in class size between the former Austrian and Russian lands. Another mechanism
could be school network density. A higher density might lead to higher school competition, which is generally believed to have a
positive effect on student performance (Urquiola, 2016). Again, there is no significant difference between the partitions in terms of
the number of elementary and secondary schools per squared km.
More broadly, if urbanization were the main channel of persistence, I should find an insignificant and small effect of the Austrian
Partition after controlling for urbanization proxies. In regressions reported in Section 3.5, I include continuous variables for school
density, population size and density. For the joint rural and urban sample, I additionally include a categorical variable describing the
type of municipality.49 As reported in Table A8, the positive and strong effect of the Austrian Partition is insensitive to the inclusion of
demographic characteristics.
Nevertheless, my results may be driven not by the size of urbanization, but rather its quality (e.g. types of settlements, ”urban
culture”). If formerly Austrian urban areas are somehow different from formerly Russian ones, and this difference affects student
performance, I should find a stronger partition effect in more urbanized areas. To check this possibility, I modify the baseline
regressions and add an interaction term between the partition dummy and either population size or density. Table A10 shows that
Table 11
Historical migration and demographic characteristics.
Year/Partition: Russian Austrian Prussian
Panel A: Migration balance (in thousand)
1881–1890 N/A −74 −233
1891–1900 N/A −169 −219
1901–1910 N/A −224 −180
1881–1910 N/A −468 −632
Panel B: Net migration in the 1871-1910s’ as % of the 1910 population
1871–1910 11% 13% 20%
Panel C: Average of annual rate of population growth
1846–1870 0.9% 0.5% 0.6%
1870–1897 1.6% 0.9% 0.6%
1897–1911 1.7% 1% 1%
Panel D: Share of age groups in 1900
<19 49.2% 48.7% N/A
20–39 30.3% 28.7% N/A
40–59 14.3% 16.7% N/A
60< 6.2% 5.4% N/A
Notes: Panels A and B: Austrian is Western Galicia; Prussian is the Duchy of Poznań. Panels C and D: Austrian is the whole Galicia; Prussian is the
Duchy of Poznań; Russian is the Congress Kingdom. Source: GUS (2003) and Zubrzycki (1953).
Table 12
The 19th century education attainment and the modern exam scores.
Dep. Variable: 6th low-stakes exam 9th high-stakes exam
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Austria 2.23 1.65 1.88 1.75 1.77 1.67 1.53 1.64
(.404)⁎⁎⁎ (.409)⁎⁎⁎ (.373)⁎⁎⁎ (.332)⁎⁎⁎ (.389)⁎⁎⁎ (.402)⁎⁎⁎ (.346)⁎⁎⁎ (.342)⁎⁎⁎
Attainment −.259 −.136 −.234 −.148 −.143 -.077 −.101 −.039
(.106)* (.075)+ (.09)⁎⁎ (.061)* (.086)+ (.078) (.086) (.076)
Austria × Attainment 0.282 0.17 .24 .162 0.172 0.11 0.128 0.069
(.114)* (.085)* (.097)* (.07)* (.097)+ (.089) (.095) (.076)
Mean of outcome -.016 −.016 0.067 0.067 0.005 0.005 0.053 0.053
R2 0.32 0.38 0.25 .36 .2 0.22 0.17 0.23
Municipalities × Time 3324 3318 4585 4587 3325 3319 4587 4581
Municipalities 475 475 656 656 475 475 656 656
Deanery/County 102 102 112 112 102 102 112 112
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Modern controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Sample Rural Rural All All Rural Rural All All
Notes: Robust and clustered standard errors (at county or deanery levels) are reported in the parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 0,1% level,
** at the 1% level, * at the 5% and + at the 10%. Columns 1 to 4 - the dependent variables are the 6th grade low-stakes exam score; Columns 5 to 8
the mathematics and science 9th grade high-stakes exam score. Table presents estimates of the effect of the 19th century education attainment on
the dependent variables. The regressions include geographical controls. In addition, some regressions include a set of modern time-variant socio-
economic covariates. The control variables are listed and explained in Table A1. The sample excludes territories which were not part of Poland
between 1918–1945.
49 There are four categories of municipalities in Poland: rural, urban-rural, urban and cities.
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neither of the interaction terms is statistically significant, meaning that there is no evidence for a heterogeneous effect by the
urbanization measures. In addition, I run the baseline regressions separately for the areas with population density larger and smaller
than the median density. The results are virtually the same (available upon request).
Finally, as Table 6 shows, the economic situation on both parts of the former border is similar, except for a higher unemployment
rate on the Austrian side. That being the case, it is unlikely that general economic forces, such as returns to education, could be
Fig. 10. The share of Protestants (Germans) and Jews in 1931. Note: the map shows the county-level share of Protestants and Jews. The borders of
the Partitions of Poland are marked by the dashed line. The modern borders of Poland are marked by the solid line. Source: author’s computation
using the Census of 1931. Own visualization based on GIS maps from Kashin and Ziblatt (2012) and MPIDR and CGG (2012).
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driving mechanisms. Finally, there is a significant positive effect on the share of people with higher education. This is consistent with
the social-norm hypothesis, as one would expect that social norms toward education influence not only the performance of students,
but also other education outcomes.
5. Identity as a determinant of persistence
This section argues that the Austrian Empire succeeded in creating a positive social norm toward education, because of a positive
interaction between institutional quality and identity. Consistent with this hypothesis, Steele and Aronson (1995) and Akerlof and
Kranton (2002) provide theoretical and empirical arguments that identity is associated with social norms affecting an individual’s
schooling choices, the school-student relationship and student achievements. A similar hypothesis is also explored by Sakalli (2018),
who documents that the Muslim identity of Turks has been reinforced by past coexistence with Armenians, which in turn, has
changed the long-run social and cultural norms toward secular education.
In the first part of this section, I conceptualize this hypothesis, in the second I provide suggestive evidence to support it. In
particular, I use historical data to measure the within-partition variation in 19th century education attainment and link it with the
modern-day performance of students.
5.1. Conceptualization
Suppose there are two time periods (i.e. the 19th century and modern time); In the first period an education system is introduced,
and individuals decide how much schooling effort e1 they exert:
=U e w e a e( ) 1
21 1 1 1 1
2
(4)
Utility comes from the difference between the benefits and costs of education. These are determined by schooling effort, wage
premium w1 and the cost parameter a1. The optimal level of schooling efforts in the first period is a fraction of the wage premium over
the cost parameter:
=e w
a
*1 1
1
It can be argued that formal institutions, which are used to eradicate individuals’ ethnic identity, will impose higher costs on
them. In the case of the Partitions of Poland, the Prussian education system required Polish students to learn in German and to study
an anti-Polish curriculum. The cost of education included then an additional cost of learning a foreign language and the intrinsic
discomfort coming from ethnic intolerance. Conversely, the Austrian system offered similar institutions, but with Polish as the
language of instruction and without anti-Polish content. Since the returns to education were relatively modest at that time
(Cvrcek and Zajicek, 2013), the model would imply that the relatively lower costs of education in the Austrian Empire contributed to
the higher schooling effort.
Next, suppose that a social norm about some behaviour emerges when all individuals consistently find this behaviour as optimal.
This social norm is then transmitted through generations and affects the schooling effort in the second period (Bisin and Verdier,
2001; Patacchini and Zenou, 2011; Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2016). The difference for future generations is that past institutions have
affected individuals’ optimal behaviour not through the standard part of the utility function, but through the social norm part.
Therefore, in the second period, individuals also face a social norm with respect to schooling effort. Using Eq. (2) and assuming, for
simplicity, that the wage premium and cost parameters in the second period are equal to unity ( = =w a 12 2 ), the second period utility
function is:
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Note that the social norm with respect to schooling effort is the optimal level of schooling effort from the previous period. An
individual’s choice in the second period depends positively on the past wage premium and negatively on the past cost parameter:
= ++e p p p* (1 )( )1 (1 )
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This simple model implies that the relatively lower costs of education in the Austrian Empire became a crucial factor for the
formation of this social norm and thus for future schooling efforts.
5.2. Evidence
The analysis so far has assumed that the effect of the Austrian and the Prussian Empires is the same across municipalities from the
same partition. In this subsection, I relax this approach and exploit the county(deanery)-level historical data on education attainment,
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to measure the within-partition variation in the exposure to 19th century institutions and link it with the current-day performance of
students. If the hypothesis is true, one should observe a positive causal effect of past education attainment, as measured by the
elementary school enrolment ratio, on the modern-day quality of education in the former Austrian Empire, but a null or negative
effect in the former Prussian Empire.
The historical data on education characteristics comes from the 19th century censuses. In the case of the Prussian Empire, the
source is the Ifo Prussian Economic History Database (Becker et al., 2014). For the Austrian Empire, I use the data collected by
Cvrcek and Zajicek (2013). Unfortunately, no such data is available for the Russian Empire. The data for the Prussian partition is
based on the 19th century Prussian counties, which I assign to modern municipalities using GIS methods and maps provided by
Kashin and Ziblatt (2012). The data for the Austrian part is based on the 19th century deaneries, which were administration units of
Fig. 11. Historical education attainment and the modern performance of students. Note: the figures present the standardized elementary school
education attainment in 1864/65 (x-axis) plotted against the municipality average (2005–2011) of the standardized 6th grade low-stakes exam (y-
axis). The former Austrian partition is in grey, the former Prussian partition is in red. The line is a fitted line from a regression of the 6th grade exam
score on the education attainment. The sample excludes territories which were not part of Poland between 1918–1945. The top panel shows the
modern rural areas only, the bottom panel the total sample. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred
to the web version of this article.)
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the Catholic Church. As there is no GIS map of deaneries from the Austrian Empire, I manually match modern municipalities with
their historical deaneries using information from Dobrowolski (1886) and the geographic dictionary by Sulimierski et al. (1895).
Unfortunately, for the Austrian part, only the census of 1865 offers data dis-aggregated to the deanery level. In order to keep a
comparable time frame, I use only data from the Prussian census of 1864. The variable of interest is the total education attainment at
the obligatory, elementary education level, which is defined as percent of children enrolled in elementary school (both public and
private). In order to ensure comparability across censuses, I standardized the measures, so that for each partition they have a mean of
zero and a standard deviation of one.
I first document a simple correlation between the standardized 19th century education attainment and the average of the modern
exam scores (2005–2011). Fig. 11 presents the correlation for the 6th grade low-stakes exam score and Fig. 12 for the 9th grade high-
Fig. 12. Historical education attainment and the modern performance of students. Note: the figures present the standardized elementary school
education attainment in 1864/65 (x-axis) plotted against the municipality average (2005–2011) of the standardized 9th grade high-stakes exam (y-
axis). The former Austrian partition is in grey, the former Prussian partition is in red. The line is a fitted line from a regression of the 9th grade exam
score on the education attainment. The sample excludes territories which were not part of Poland between 1918–1945. The top panel shows the
modern rural areas only, the bottom panel the total sample. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred
to the web version of this article.)
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stakes exam, in a breakdown by the rural and total samples. Consistently with the hypothesis, we observe positive correlations in the
case of the Austria partition (which is significant for the 9th grade exam), but negative in the case of the Prussian partition (sig-
nificant for the 6th grade exam and the rural sample).
The reported correlations are likely to be biased. For instance, the favourable location of a municipality might affect its long-run
prosperity and influence historical education attainment along with the current performance of students. In order to limit bias, I run
regressions of the standardized 6th or 9th grade exam scores on historical education attainment, and control for a quadratic poly-
nomial of longitude and latitude, and geographic characteristics. I pool the data from the Austrian and Prussian partitions, include a
dummy for Austria and interact it with the historical measure:= + + + + + +y A Aus Aus A G Xmcpt cp p p cp mcp mcpt mcpt1 2 3 (6)
where ymcwt is the outcome variable for a municipality m from county (deanery) c and partition p at time t (available for 2005–2011).
Acp is the education attainment from the 1860s, which is available at the county (deanery) level, Ausp is a dummy for the former
Austrian partition and Gmcp is a set of exogenous geographic controls. In addition to this, in some specifications, I include a set of time
variant municipality socio-economic characteristics Xmcpt, defined in Table A1. I pool all the years and use a random effect estimator.
The standard errors are clustered at the county (deanery) level.
Table 11presents the estimates of Eq. (6). Columns 1 and 2 show that the correlations between the education attainment and the
6th grade exam scores are significant and negative for the former Prussian partition. One standard deviation increase in the at-
tainment is connected with a 0.14 - 0.26σ decrease in the student performance. Importantly, these correlations are close to zero or
positive for the former Austrian partition. The correlations in the case of the 9th grade exam (Columns 3 and 4) have the same sign,
but the coefficients are smaller in absolute terms and insignificant.
The simple control on observable approach is unlikely to solve the endogeneity problem. However, assuming that the remaining
bias is the same in both regions, the historical expansion of the education system would have a more positive effect on the current
student performance in the former Austria than in the former Prussia. This is in line with the proposed hypothesis, as in the Austrian
Empire there was a positive interaction between identity and institutions. The social norms affecting student performance were more
likely to emerge in municipalities with a larger attachment to the historical Austrian education system. Alternatively, because of the
negative interaction between the institutional quality and identity, the more intensive historical exposure to Prussian education led to
a stronger opposing social norm toward the education system, lowering schooling effort. Furthermore, using arguments from
Section 4.1.1, the weaker relationship in the case of the 9th grade high-stakes exam points to the importance of social norms as a
channel of persistence. Nevertheless, the inclusiveness of the Austrian secondary education or the existence of two universities and
one technical college in Galicia50 might be another source of persistence.
6. Conclusions
This paper has argued that the Partitions of Poland provide a unique natural experiment for studying the determinants of in-
stitutional persistence. First, I exploited this setting to investigate the long-lasting effect of the 19th century education systems, which
were imposed by Austria, Prussia, and Russia, on modern education outcomes. Despite the modern similarities of the former bor-
derlands of the Empires, I estimated a positive and large effect of the former Austrian Empire compared to the former Russian Empire,
but no effect of the Prussian Empire compared to the Russian. The magnitude of the effect of the former Austrian Empire is com-
parable with the Black vs. White achievement gap in the US.
How can we explain these results, and what can we learn about the persistence of institutions? The main hypothesis here posits
that an interaction between institutional quality and identity might be crucial for the creation of a positive social norm toward
institutions, and thus for long-lasting persistence. In particular, because the Austrian education system actively supported Polish
identity, positive norms toward education system were more likely to emerge in the Austrian partition and these could be transmitted
through generations and still affect student and parental effort. The Prussian partition serves as the counter-factual situation, where
an almost identical education system was used as a tool of Germanisation, and no positive social norm affects the modern perfor-
mance of students.
This result might be of crucial importance for policymakers who wish to improve the situation of permanently underdeveloped
regions. For instance, the implication of my hypothesis is that good education institutions are more likely to affect long-run de-
velopment if they are not in opposition to the social identity of a population of interest. One might consider provision of schooling in
a minority’s language (e.g. for Hungarians in Romania, Poles in Lithuania or Russians in Ukraine) as an example of such a policy. On
the other hand, this paper suggests that large interventions aimed at equalizing education differences, as carried out by the post-WWII
communist government in Poland, might have had a large effect on the quantity of education, but a limited effect on the quality of
education.
The proposed sources of persistence can also shed light on the existing, and often puzzling, findings in the literature on in-
50 There were no institutions of higher education in the Prussian part of Poland.
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stitutional persistence. For instance, a study of Africa, by Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013), reported that the pre-colonial
ethnic institutions matter for long-run development to a much larger extent than the national ones created by the colonial powers.
Similarly, in the Indian context, Iyer (2010) reported a negative effect of British colonial rules and a positive one of the native states.
These are consistent with my hypothesis that institutional persistence is determined by the interaction between institutions and
identity. The native institutions were to a larger extent compatible with existing social identities. In contrast, the external powers
imposed institutions based on borders which broadly ignored ethnic divisions.
The interaction between institutions and ethnic identity can be perceived as an ingredient of inter-ethnic inequalities and modes
of cooperation. As suggested by Jha (2013), limited ethnic assimilation might lead to “the presence of a nonreplicable and non-
expropriable source of inter-ethnic complementarity”, which fosters ethnic tolerance by increasing the long-run cost of potential
ethnic conflict. In addition, Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) claim that the outcome of inter-ethnic complementarity is a higher
specialization in an economy, which, in turn, increases productivity.51 In the context of Native American tribes, Dippel (2014)
presents evidence that the forced integration of linguistically homogeneous sub-tribal groups has had a negative effect on long-run
economic development through the lowering of the quality of local governance. I have added another channel to this debate by
pointing out that a lack of (forced) assimilation could ensure that all ethnic groups share the long-run benefits from institutional
change.52
Finally, this paper has contributed to the literature on the formation of human capital by pointing to the importance of social
norms for the quality of education. Many authors have claimed that proper institutional design is crucial for the formation of human
capital (Galor and Moav, 2006; Becker and Woessmann, 2009; Goldin and Katz, 2009; Cantoni and Yuchtman, 2013). However, this
paper suggests that analysing institutions outside of their social context might be insufficient.
Table A1
Variables description: The regression discontinuity design.
Variable Description Time
Panel A: Regression discontinuity design - Geographic controls
Altitude: The municipality average of altitude in meters. −
Precipitation: The municipality average (1950–2000) annual precipitation in mm. −
Temperature: The municipality average (1950–2000) annual temperature in C°. −
Panel B: Regression discontinuity design - Controls
Density: Population density. 2005-11
Expenditure: Local government (municipality) total expenditure per capita. 2005-11
Education expenditure: Local government (municipality) education expenditure per capita. 2005-11
Kindergarten attendance: Rate of student pre-elementary schools’ attendance. 2005-11
Migration: Migration balance per 1000 inhabitants. 2005-11
Population: Total population. 2005-11
Population density: Total population per km2 2005-11
Secondary school scholarization: Rate of student secondary schools’ attendance. 2005-11
Elementary schools per km2: The number of public elementary schools per km2 2005-11
Secondary schools per km2: The number of public secondary schools per km2 2005-11
Unemployment rate: Share of unemployed among the active population. 2005-11
Panel C: Other variables
Agriculture: Share of employed in the agriculture sector among all employed. 2010
Additional lessons: Average number of additional lessons per elementary school. 2009
Class size: Average class size in elementary schools. 2009
Higher education: Share of people with higher education. 2002
People aged 0–18: Share of people aged 0–18. 2005-11
Education Value Added: The estimates of the Education Value Added (gain between 6th and 9th grade). 2013
Election turnout: The voter turnout for presidential, parliamentary, local elections, and the EU-accession referendum. 1998-14
The EU-accession result: The share of votes in favour (”Yes”) of the EU-accession during the referendum. 2003
Notes: All the variables come from the Central Statistical Office of Poland, except the variables for 2009, which come from the System of Education
Information, for the education value added, which comes from the Education Value Added Team, for the geographical controls, which come form
WorldClim.org, and for the election turnout and results, which come from the Polish National Electoral Commission.
51 On the other hand, because of the heterogeneity of preferences, fragmented societies are more likely to have inefficient and poorly-managed
public goods (La Porta et al., 1999). Also, the existence of heterogeneous ethnic groups, which are clearly distinguishable might motivate a ruling
party to use ethnic conflict as a tool of expropriation (Caselli and Coleman, 2013) or prevent voters from replacing an inefficient politician
(i Miquel, 2007).
52 In the case of education, one might further argue that institutional change leads to a more educated society, which likely increases ethnic
tolerance.
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Table A2
Variables description: LiTS (2006 and 2010) and EVA (2010).
Variable Description
Panel A: LiTS - Outcomes
First or second priority of governmental spending on
public education:
”In your opinion, which of these fields should be given first or second priority for extra government
spending?” with possible answer including: education, health care, housing, pensions, assisting the
poor, environment protection, public infrastructure, other (the respondent could choose only one
answer). The dummy equals 1 if the respondent chose education for first or second priority and 0
otherwise.
Intelligence and skills important for life success: ”In your opinion, which of the following factors is the most important to succeed in life in our
country now?” with possible answer including: Effort and Hard Work; Intelligence and Skills; By
Political Connections; By Breaking the Law; Other (the respondent could choose only one answer).
The dummy equals 1 if the respondent chose Intelligence and Skills and 0 otherwise.
Log spending on education: ”Approximately how much did your household spend on education during the past 12 months?”.
Panel B: LiTS - Exogenous controls
Gender: Equals 1 if the respondent is a female and 0 otherwise.
Age: Age of the respondent in years.
Having a child: Equals 1 if the respondent has at least one child younger than 14 years old and 0 otherwise.
Panel C: EVA - Outcomes
Family tradition important in school selection: If parents considered an alternative school (to the local one), the question asks to select factors and
sources of information which were important for the final selection of the school. Respondents
could select multiple answers, family tradition is one of the possibility. The dummy equals 1 if the
respondent selected family tradition.
Panel D: EVA - Exogenous controls
Child gender: Equals 1 if the child is a female and 0 otherwise.
Respondent gender: Equals 1 if the respondent is a female and 0 otherwise.
Age: Age of the respondent in years.
Parent: Equals 1 if the respondent is a parent of the child.
Table A3
Variables description: Social Diagnosis (2011 and 2013).
Variable Description
Panel A: Social Diagnosis - Outcomes
Education - Important for a good life: ”What do you think is the most important for a successful and happy life?” Respondents are asked to
select at most three answers, education is one of the options. The dummy equals 1 if the respondent
chose education and 0 otherwise.
Satisfied with Received Education: ”Are you satisfied from your education?” the respondents could select one answer from a six-degree
scale where 1 is ”Very Satisfied” and 6 ”Not Satisfied at all”. The dummy equals 1 if the respondent
choose degree ”Very Satisfied”, ”Satisfied” or ”Somehow Satisfied” and 0 otherwise.
University as a desired degree for a child: ”What is the desired level of education for your child ?” the respondents could select one answer
from a five-degree scale where 1 is ”Primary-vocational” and 5 ”Higher Education - MA”. The
dummy equals 1 if the respondent choose degree ”Higher Education - MA” or ”Higher Education -
BA” and 0 otherwise.
Agree that corporal punishment is important for a child
development:
”Do you agree with the following statement: Without corporal punishments it is impossible to rise
children properly”. the respondents could select one answer from a seven-degree scale where 1 is
”Definitely Yes”, 4 is ”Neither Yes nor No” and 7 ”Definitely No”. The categorical variable equals 1
if the respondent choose ”Definitely Yes”, ”Yes” or ”Rather Yes”; 2 if ”Neither Yes nor No”; 3 if
”Rather No”, ”No” or ”Definitely No”. The reported average marginal effects show the effect on the
last category (=3).
Panel B: Social Diagnosis - Exogenous controls
Gender: Equals 1 if the respondent is a female and 0 otherwise
Age: Age of the respondent in years
Size of home-town: A categorical variable with a six-degree scale where 1 is ”Cities larger than 500 thousand” and 6 is
”Villages”
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Table A4
The Akaike information criteria.
Border: Russian-Prussian Russian-Austrian
Outcome Exam: 6th grade 9th grade 6th grade 9th grade
(1) (2) (3) (4)
None 4612.0893 4750.5143 5339.8517 5137.3178
Linear 4590.8342 4738.2301 5287.7064 5099.3671
Quadratic 4590.0828 4731.9785 5281.559 5099.2385
Cubic 4591.2627 4733.8847 5262.8031 5095.0966
Quartile 4591.2627 4733.8847 5262.3302 5094.2096
Notes: The table shows the Akaike Information Critera for the regressions of either 6th or 9th grade exam score on the partition dummy D, which
equals 1 for the former Russian areas and 0 for either the former Prussian (Columns 1–2) or Austrian (Columns 3–4) territories, and different
polynomials of longitude and latitude. Each row represents different polynomial order. The regressions use 50 km bandwidth.
Table A5
Robustness: Polynomials in latitude and longitude.
Dep. Variable: 6th grade low-stakes exam 9th grade high-stakes exam
Polynomial/Bandwidth: < 50km <75km <100km <50km <75km <100km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A : The Russian - Austrian border
Linear −.570 −.695 −.631 −.453 −.492 −.408
(.116)⁎⁎⁎ (.108)⁎⁎⁎ (.103)⁎⁎⁎ (.124)⁎⁎⁎ (.111)⁎⁎⁎ (.108)⁎⁎⁎
Quadratic −.561 −.622 −.615 −.409 −.432 −.390
(.125)⁎⁎⁎ (.115)⁎⁎⁎ (.110)⁎⁎⁎ (.131)⁎⁎⁎ (.117)⁎⁎⁎ (.113)⁎⁎⁎
Cubic −.549 −.576 −.551 −.392 −.407 −.332
(.123)⁎⁎⁎ (.115)⁎⁎⁎ (.110)⁎⁎⁎ (.133)⁎⁎⁎ (.120)⁎⁎⁎ (.118)⁎⁎⁎
Quartile -.558 −.566 −.549 −.405 −.389 −.320
(.123)⁎⁎⁎ (.117)⁎⁎⁎ (.110)⁎⁎⁎ (.132)⁎⁎⁎ (.122)⁎⁎⁎ (.117)⁎⁎⁎
Mean of outcome 0.1 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.03 0
Municipalities × Time 2107 2981 3688 2106 2981 3681
Municipalities 301 426 527 301 426 527
Panel B : The Russian - Prussian border
Linear -.030 .165 .036 -.096 .340 .246
(.149) (.141) (.126) (.164) (.154)⁎⁎ (.133)*
Quadratic −.059 .129 .041 -.132 .317 .244
(.156) (.141) (.127) (.169) (.156)⁎⁎ (.137)*
Cubic −.060 .099 .044 -.135 .294 .163
(.154) (.141) (.132) (.170) (.156)* (.140)
Quartile -.101 .033 .049 -.178 .253 .131
(.153) (.143) (.132) (.170) (.157) (.141)
Mean of outcome −.22 −.23 −.27 −.04 −.05 −.12
Municipalities × Time 1442 2135 2898 1442 2135 2894
Municipalities 206 305 414 206 305 414
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Modern controls No No No No No No
Sample Rural Rural Rural Rural Rural Rural
Notes:Robust and clustered standard errors (at municipality level) are reported in the parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 0,1% level, ** at
the 1% level and * at the 5%. Columns 1 to 3 - the dependent variable is the 6th grade low-stakes exam score; Columns 4 to 6 - the mathematics and
science 9th grade high-stakes exam score. Table presents estimates of the coefficient β from the regression 1 of the dependent variable on the
partition dummy D, which equals 1 for the former Russian areas and 0 for either the former Austrian (Panel A) or Prussian (Panel B) territories. The
regressions use 50 km (Columns 1 and 4), 75km (Columns 2 and 5) and 100km (Columns 3 and 6) bandwidths.
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Table A6
Robustness: Polynomials in latitude and longitude, the total sample.
Polynomial/Bandwidth: 6th grade low-stakes exam 9th grade high-stakes exam
<50km <75km <100km <50km <75km <100km
Polynomial / (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A : The Russian - Austrian border
Linear -.614 −.713 −.664 −.457 −.494 −.445
(.106)⁎⁎⁎ (.098)⁎⁎⁎ (.093)⁎⁎⁎ (.110)⁎⁎⁎ (.099)⁎⁎⁎ (.095)⁎⁎⁎
Quadratic −.554 −.618 −.635 −.402 −.431 −.433
(.116)⁎⁎⁎ (.105)⁎⁎⁎ (.099)⁎⁎⁎ (.122)⁎⁎⁎ (.107)⁎⁎⁎ (.103)⁎⁎⁎
Cubic −.533 −.569 −.577 −.384 −.411 −.393
(.116)⁎⁎⁎ (.107)⁎⁎⁎ (.101)⁎⁎⁎ (.125)⁎⁎⁎ (.111)⁎⁎⁎ (.107)⁎⁎⁎
Quartile -.547 −.556 −.573 −.400 −.391 −.376
(.116)⁎⁎⁎ (.108)⁎⁎⁎ (.101)⁎⁎⁎ (.123)⁎⁎⁎ (.113)⁎⁎⁎ (.107)⁎⁎⁎
Mean of outcome 0.19 0.19 0.16 0.1 0.1 0.08
Municipalities × Time 2606 3640 4508 2605 3641 4502
Municipalities 373 521 645 373 521 645
Panel B : The Russian - Prussian border
Linear -.134 .040 -.049 −.013 .243 .173
(.121) (.114) (.100) (.123) (.118)⁎⁎ (.100)*
Quadratic −.153 .006 -.045 −.090 .211 .181
(.128) (.115) (.101) (.132) (.120)* (.103)*
Cubic −.151 −.025 −.055 −.092 .195 .130
(.128) (.115) (.104) (.132) (.120) (.106)
Quartile -.191 −.091 −.046 −.129 .147 .106
(.128) (.116) (.105) (.132) (.120) (.106)
Mean of outcome −.15 −.15 −.18 −.03 −.02 −.08
Municipalities × Time 2114 3094 4214 2114 3094 4210
Municipalities 302 442 602 302 442 602
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Modern controls No No No No No No
Sample All All All All All All
Notes: Robust and clustered standard errors (at municipality level) are reported in the parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 0,1% level, ** at
the 1% level and * at the 5%. Columns 1 to 3 - the dependent variable is the 6th grade low-stakes exam score; Columns 4 to 6 - the mathematics and
science 9th grade high-stakes exam score. Table presents estimates of the coefficient β from the regression 1 of the dependent variable on the
partition dummy D, which equals 1 for the former Russian areas and 0 for either the former Austrian (Panel A) or Prussian (Panel B) territories. The
regressions use 50 km (Columns 1 and 4), 75km (Columns 2 and 5) and 100km (Columns 3 and 6) bandwidths. The regressions use the whole
sample.
Table A7
Robustness: Polynomials in distance.
Dep. Variable: 6th grade low-stakes exam 9th grade high-stakes exam
Polynomial/Bandwidth: < 50km <75km <100km <50km <75km <100km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A : The Russian - Austrian border
Linear −.575 −.671 −.577 −.468 −.477 −.326
(.170)⁎⁎⁎ (.141)⁎⁎⁎ (.133)⁎⁎⁎ (.149)⁎⁎⁎ (.125)⁎⁎⁎ (.124)⁎⁎⁎
Quadratic −.483 −.434 −.556 −.273 −.361 −.459
(.235)⁎⁎ (.198)⁎⁎ (.177)⁎⁎⁎ (.217) (.177)⁎⁎ (.160)⁎⁎⁎
Cubic −.504 −.424 −.301 −.574 −.224 −.206
(.343) (.267) (.238) (.300)* (.235) (.216)
Quartile -.393 −.444 −.388 −.470 −.234 −.249
(.330) (.265)* (.235)* (.290) (.234) (.212)
Mean of outcome 0.1 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.03 0
Municipalities × Time 2107 2981 3688 2106 2981 3681
Municipalities 301 426 527 301 426 527
Panel B : The Russian - Prussian border
Linear -.068 .107 .001 .020 .431 .292
(.162) (.138) (.120) (.172) (.150)⁎⁎⁎ (.131)⁎⁎
Quadratic −.384 −.221 .073 -.118 −.162 .275
(.240) (.203) (.181) (.249) (.209) (.190)
Cubic −.448 −.492 −.356 −.324 −.344 −.345
(.321) (.265)* (.234) (.332) (.272) (.240)
Quartile -.816 −.436 −.550 .065 .048 -.341
(continued on next page)
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Table A7 (continued)
Dep. Variable: 6th grade low-stakes exam 9th grade high-stakes exam
Polynomial/Bandwidth: < 50km <75km <100km <50km <75km <100km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(.460)* (.339) (.287)* (.450) (.345) (.297)
Mean of outcome −.22 −.23 −.27 −.04 −.05 −.12
Municipalities × Time 1442 2135 2898 1442 2135 2894
Municipalities 206 305 414 206 305 414
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Modern controls No No No No No No
Sample Rural Rural Rural Rural Rural Rural
Notes: Robust and clustered standard errors (at municipality level) are reported in the parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 0,1% level, ** at
the 1% level and * at the 5%. Columns 1 to 3 - the dependent variable is the 6th grade low-stakes exam score; Columns 4 to 6 - the mathematics and
science 9th grade high-stakes exam score. Table presents estimates of the coefficient β from the regression 1 of the dependent variable on the
partition dummy D, which equals 1 for the former Russian areas and 0 for either the former Austrian (Panel A) or Prussian (Panel B) territories. The
regressions use 50 km (Columns 1 and 4), 75km (Columns 2 and 5) and 100km (Columns 3 and 6) bandwidths.
Table A8
Robustness: Polynomials in latitude and longitude, including socio-economic covariates.
Dep. Variable: 6th grade low-stakes exam 9th grade high-stakes exam
Polynomial/Bandwidth: < 50km <75km <100km <50km <75km <100km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A : The Russian - Austrian border
Linear -.388 −.465 −.444 −.296 −.327 −.250
(.117)⁎⁎⁎ (.106)⁎⁎⁎ (.100)⁎⁎⁎ (.128)⁎⁎ (.113)⁎⁎⁎ (.107)⁎⁎
Quadratic −.424 −.451 −.472 −.309 −.318 −.271
(.125)⁎⁎⁎ (.113)⁎⁎⁎ (.107)⁎⁎⁎ (.133)⁎⁎ (.116)⁎⁎⁎ (.110)⁎⁎
Cubic −.413 −.412 −.416 −.294 −.297 −.218
(.124)⁎⁎⁎ (.114)⁎⁎⁎ (.109)⁎⁎⁎ (.136)⁎⁎ (.122)⁎⁎ (.116)*
Quartile -.417 −.404 −.417 −.305 −.281 −.210
(.124)⁎⁎⁎ (.115)⁎⁎⁎ (.109)⁎⁎⁎ (.134)⁎⁎ (.123)⁎⁎ (.116)*
Mean of outcome 0.1 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.03 0
Municipalities × Time 2102 2973 3679 2101 2973 3672
Municipalities 301 426 527 301 426 527
Panel B : The Russian - Prussian border
Linear -.046 .112 .090 -.180 .294 .264
(.134) (.131) (.121) (.153) (.148)⁎⁎ (.130)⁎⁎
Quadratic −.100 .087 .103 -.217 .284 .274
(.142) (.132) (.121) (.160) (.151)* (.133)⁎⁎
Cubic −.105 .075 .115 -.220 .269 .203
(.141) (.132) (.125) (.160) (.152)* (.137)
Quartile -.082 .038 .125 -.209 .234 .165
(.141) (.134) (.126) (.159) (.152) (.137)
Mean of outcome −.22 −.23 −.27 −.04 −.05 −.12
Municipalities × Time 1442 2135 2898 1442 2135 2894
Municipalities 206 305 414 206 305 414
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Modern controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Rural Rural Rural Rural Rural Rural
Notes: Robust and clustered standard errors (at municipality level) are reported in the parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 0,1% level, ** at
the 1% level and * at the 5%. Columns 1 to 3 - the dependent variable is the 6th grade low-stakes exam score; Columns 4 to 6 - the mathematics and
science 9th grade high-stakes exam score. Table presents estimates of the coefficient β from the regression 1 of the dependent variable on the
partition dummy D, which equals 1 for the former Russian areas and 0 for either the former Austrian (Panel A) or Prussian (Panel B) territories, and
the set of socio-economic variables explained in Table A1. The regressions use 50 km (Columns 1 and 4), 75km (Columns 2 and 5) and 100km
(Columns 3 and 6) bandwidths.
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Table A9
Ethnic and religious composition in 1931.
Border: Russian-Prussian Russian-Austrian
Variable/Partition: Prussian Russia Diff Austrian Russian Diff
mean sd mean sd (1)-(3) mean sd mean sd (6)-(8)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A : Urban and rural areas < 50km from the borders (in pp.)
Germans 7.172 4.656 6.28 5.153 0.892 0.255 0.835 0.089 0.109 0.166
Poles 91.031 4.484 86.833 3.72 4.198* 89.806 10.796 89.494 3.988 0.311
Jews 1.804 3.219 6.63 2.771 −4.825** 8.274 4.862 10.736 4.177 −2.462
Greek-Catholics 0.061 0.039 0.038 0.008 0.023 3.958 11.859 0.041 0.019 3.917
Orthodox 0.112 0.147 0.099 0.057 0.013 3.417 9.405 0.097 0.126 3.32
Number of counties 29 6 26 10
Panel B : Rural areas < 50km from the borders (in pp.)
Germans 8.631 5.467 7.543 5.481 1.089 0.157 0.406 0.082 0.128 0.075
Poles 90.873 5.249 91.051 5.327 −.178 93.472 11.243 95.499 1.783 −2.027
Jews 0.375 0.869 1.065 0.73 −.69+ 3.099 2.244 4.584 1.786 −1.484+
Greek-Catholics 0.05 0.038 0.035 0.014 0.015 4.412 12.999 0.032 0.011 4.38
Orthodox 0.061 0.096 0.057 0.028 0.004 3.89 10.589 0.042 0.041 3.848
Number of counties 24 6 25 9
Notes: Means and standard deviations for the counties from 1931, located at most 50km either from the former Russian-Prussian or Russian-Austrian
borders. The counties located in Ślşskie voivodeships are excluded. Germans (Poles) is a share of German (Polish) speaking people in the total or
rural populations. The variables are defined in the same way for Jews, Greek-Catholics and Orthodox, but ethnicity is based on religion affiliation,
not language. ** denotes significance at the 1% level, * at the 5% level and + at the 10% level.
Table A10
The interactions between the Partitions effect and urbanization
Dep. Variable: 6th grade low-stakes exam 9th grade high-stakes exam
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: The Russian - Austrian border
Partitions effect −.467 −.580 −.604 −.531 −.361 −.311 −.393 −.369
(Russia=1) (.149)⁎⁎ (.199)⁎⁎ (.126)⁎⁎⁎ (.119)⁎⁎⁎ (.158)* (.218) (.135)⁎⁎ (.131)⁎⁎
Interaction term .00005 .002 0.00006 −.00003 .0001 .0002 0.00001 −.00007
(.0001) (.002) (.00004) (.0002) (.0001) (.002) (.00004) (.0002)
Mean of outcome .1 0.1 0.19 0.19 0.02 0.02 0.1 0.1
R2 .35 0.35 0.37 0.37 0.24 0.23 0.27 0.27
Municipalities 301 301 373 373 301 301 373 373
Mun. × Time 2107 2107 2606 2606 2106 2106 2605 2600
Panel B: The Russian - Prussian border
Partitions effect −.149 −.105 −.099 −.148 −.235 -.011 0.02 −.06
(Russia=1) (.188) (.309) (.13) (.127) (.213) (.313) (.145) (.14)
Interaction term .00008 0.0003 −.00002 0.0001 .00006 −.003 −.00009 −.0001
(.0002) (.004) (.00003) (.0002) (.0001) (.004) (.00004)* (.0001)
Mean of outcome -.22 −.22 −.15 −.15 −.04 −.04 −.03 −.03
R2 .1 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.14
Municipalities 206 206 302 302 206 206 302 302
Mun. × Time 1442 1442 2114 2114 1442 1442 2114 2114
Interaction var. Pop. Dens. Pop. Dens. Pop. Dens. Pop. Dens.
Geo. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Modern controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Rural Rural All All Rural Rural All All
Notes: Robust and clustered standard errors (at municipality level) are reported in the parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 0,1% level, ** at
the 1% level, * at the 5% and + at the 10%. Columns 1 to 4 - the dependent variables are the 6th grade low-stakes exam score; Columns 5 to 8 - the
mathematics and science 9th grade high-stakes exam score. Table presents estimates of the coefficient β from the regression (1) of the dependent
variable on the partition dummy D, which equals 1 for the former Russian areas and 0 for either the former Austrian (Panel A) or Prussian (Panel B)
territories. In addition the regressions include an interaction term between the partition dummy and population number (in 10 thousand) (Columns
1, 3, 5 and 7) or population density (Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8), a quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude and a set of geographic and modern
covariates. All the regressions use 50 km bandwidth.
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Supplementary material
Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at 10.1016/j.jce.2018.10.007
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